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The recent commodity price drop has renewed attention on the importance to diversify 
resource-dependent economies in particular to limit their exposure to commodity price 
volatility. While commodity price booms can be an opportunity to diversify the economy if 
managed properly, it remains an empirical question whether this has effectively been the 
case.  
 
Using a panel of 78 resource-dependent countries over 1970-2012 we tackle this question 
thanks to cointegration analysis, dynamic macro-panel estimators, as well as analyses of 
diversification outcomes during selected commodity price boom and bust episodes.  
 
While our econometric results evidence a stable and significant impact of commodity price 
booms on export concentration through a more concentrated mix of already exported 
products, this relationship includes both an increase in export concentration during 
commodity price booms and an increase in export diversification during commodity price 
drops. We also evidence a higher increase in export concentration during the 2000s 
commodity price booms than the 1970s, which explains the urging current need of most 
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Since the recent commodity price drop, numerous resource-dependent countries have faced a situation in which 
their resource sector has not been able to sustain their economy as a source of resource revenues or foreign 
exchange reserves. As a result, some of them may have missed the opportunity to diversify their economic structure 
during the preceding commodity price boom. 
While a growing number of these countries accumulated sizable reserves during the preceding commodity price 
boom, it triggers the question of the relevance of such policies when the domestic financing needs are important 
and the domestic return of capital investment exceeds the return on international financial markets. While not 
contemporaneously related to a more diversified economy, investments in infrastructure, energy provision, and 
human capital can be the foundations for a more diversified economy producing products of higher quality in the 
longer run. 
According to the resource curse literature1 export diversification can be seen as a desirable feature because 
macroeconomic volatility could be a main explanation of the resource curse (Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). 
Moreover, exports diversification can promote job opportunities for countries heavily dependent on some capital-
intensive commodities such as hydrocarbons, and limit social unrest. Popularized by the Netherlands experience in 
managing natural gas wealth in the 1960s, the Dutch disease phenomenon formalized by Corden and Neary (1982) 
can also become an undesirable pattern. A commodity windfall can provide factor reallocation toward the resource 
sector (resource allocation channel) and provide increased sources of spending which could trigger exchange rate 
overvaluation, a loss of price competitiveness and a decrease in the size of the non-resource tradable sector 
(spending channel). This pattern can be especially detrimental if it crowds-out the manufacturing sector2 which can 
provide positive externalities to the rest of the economy. 
As a result, diversification is often seen as a policy objective for an economy and to a better extent for an economy 
heavily reliant on exhaustible commodities such as minerals or hydrocarbons. While it is unclear according to trade 
theories whether export diversification is optimal or not (Cadot et al, 2013), it can be seen as a desirable 
recommendation for countries over-reliant on commodity price fluctuations. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that 
among resource-dependent countries, some countries like Botswana (Pegg, 2010) managed to maintain a resource-
based economy with good economic outcomes even though it is still unclear whether such experiences could be 
replicated elsewhere.  
Not all diversification patterns may be alike so that the type of activities in which a country specializes can be 
important. As a result, specializing in goods of higher quality or produced by more developed economies could be 
more conducive to economic growth (Hausmann et al, 2007). One can see in a network view the production scope as 
a production tree with more sophisticated products localized in clusters of activities. Initially specializing in core 
activities provides further diversification potential in related activities while initial endowment in peripheral products 
like minerals provide limited potential for economic diversification.  
Following the study of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), a great part of the literature on diversification focused on the 
pattern of diversification along the development path. This pioneer work evidenced a U-shape pattern with 
countries diversifying their economy at earlier stages of development before re-specializing. While this result has 
been confirmed for export diversification (Cadot et al, 2011), some recent papers cast some doubt on this non-linear 
relationship and find a positive linear trend of export diversification along the development path (Parteka and 
Tamberini 2013, Mau 2016). Beyond the level of economic development, Agosin et al (2012), provide one of the first 
empirical studies on panel data assessing various determinants3. Various studies have followed focusing on different 
channels impacting export diversification. 
1 Frankel (2010) and Van der Ploeg (2011) provide extensive surveys of the literature surrounding the resource curse. 
2 The decreasing size of the manufacturing sector can also be associated with an increased productivity in the manufacturing 
sector moving less productive workers away from the sector (Kuralbayeva and Stefanski, 2013). 
3 They find some importance of geographic remoteness, lower trade openness, lower RER volatility, and human capital 
accumulation in increasing export diversification. 
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Trade facilitation agreements seem conducive to more export diversification (Beverelli et al, 2015) even though 
different types of trade agreements can have diverging effects (Persson and Wilhelmsson, 2016). Nicita and Rollo 
(2015) also find that both direct and indirect improvements in market access conditions have increased export 
diversification among Sub Saharan African countries. Financial development can increase the likelihood of a firm to 
export to a larger number of countries especially for financially-dependent sectors (Chan and Manova, 2015). 
Makhlouf et al (2015) suggest that trade openness leads to export specialization in autocracies and export 
diversification in democracies. Domestic institutional reforms can also impact the diversification pattern as 
evidenced by Sheng and Yang (2016) for China, who show that FDI ownership liberalization, improvement in contract 
enforcement and a reduction of offshoring costs have been associated with an increase in exports variety. While FDI 
flows can improve export diversification, the origin of the flow may also matter, with South-South FDI flows 
increasing export diversification and quality upgrading more than North-South flows (Amighini and Sanfilippo, 2014). 
Wiig and Kolstad (2012) provide a political economy explanation of diverging diversification experiences, 
emphasizing the importance of rent-seeking behavior of the ruling elites in impeding diversification in resource-rich 
countries if it decreases their own interests in the economy.  Finally, Habiyaremyie (2016) pointed out that “Angola-
mode-deals” between Chinese companies and African governments has improved export diversification thanks to a 
reduction in the infrastructure bottlenecks negotiated against the access to natural resources. 
When analyzing the diversification of an economy, we face the challenge of identifying the relevant indicator. We 
can identify 3 main indices of export diversification in the literature with their own benefits and challenges (Theil 
index, Herfindahl index, Gini index)4. One advantage of the Theil index is the possibility to disentangle between the 
intensive margin component (rebalancing of existing product lines) and the extensive margin component (creation of 
new product lines). Measures of diversification also differ depending on what they measure, some indices focusing 
on export partners’ diversification, export diversification, or output diversification. Closely related measures also 
include the pattern of structural transformation5 (value-added importance of the primary or manufacturing sector in 
the economy) or the quality upgrading of products. While focusing mainly on export diversification measured by 
each component of the Theil index, we also extend the analysis to quality upgrading and structural transformation. 
Another challenge when analyzing the evolving structure of an economy is to disentangle various channels which 
could affect the outcome with various lags. Among the common determinants of a diversified economy we may 
think of short-run determinants such as price competitiveness6, medium-run determinants such as financial 
development, political and economic institutions, trade policy measures (commercial agreements, trade barriers), 
long-run determinants such as the stock of human capital or the quality of infrastructures. On top of that, one may 
think about quasi country-specific determinants which include geographic remoteness7 or the type of former 
colony8. Analyzing the dynamic impact of commodity price booms on diversification, this analysis will focus mainly 
on a short-to-medium run perspective. 
The literature on diversification often focuses on a heterogeneous sample of countries which includes both resource-
rich and resource-poor economies. While resource-poor economies face their own challenges for diversifying and 
upgrading their production, it seems important to provide some insights for resource-dependent countries, which 
may suffer most from excessive specialization in the resource sector. This paper also provides an opportunity to 
analyze the impact of commodity price booms not only on the evolution of the manufacturing sector through Dutch 
disease effects but also on export diversification and quality upgrading. 
4 See Cadot et al (2013) for an extensive discussion of their pros and cons. 
5 Structural transformation often defined as the dynamic reallocation of resources from less productive to more productive 
sectors will be considered here through the evolution of the value-added share of the manufacturing sector in the economy. 
McMillan and Rodrik (2014) provide evidence for the impact of structural transformation on economic development through the 
reallocation of labor from low-productivity activities to higher-productivity activities. 
6 While exchange rate undervaluation is seen as a standard driver of both exports growth and diversification, Sekkat (2016) finds 
no evidence of this channel. 
7 Even geographic remoteness can be seen as an evolving component depending among other things on the existing trade flow 
networks or the transport costs. 
8 The number of years between the start of oil production and a country political independence seems to be positively related to 
more diversified exports (Omgba, 2014), so that the type of colony (extractive colonies or settlers’ colonies) and its related 
institutions still impact current economic outcomes.  
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When analyzing policies for countries relying on their resource sector we face the problem of identifying the relevant 
countries. One main criticism of the past resource curse literature has been to rely excessively on resource-
dependence indices because they are an endogenous driver of resource growth9. In our case, we are less worried 
about this issue because our aim is to select countries whose resource sector is important for the economy. A 
selection based on resource abundance would be less relevant because it would include under-the ground reserves 
not already exploited which would give a misleading picture. Resource rent does not seem to be an option because 
of the lack of comparable index with a large country and commodity coverage10. As a result, we select in this analysis 
countries according to their resource-dependence pattern, so that the resulting sample consists of 78 resource-
dependent countries over 1970-2012. 
We first perform a cointegration analysis in order to test the cointegration relationship between diversification 
improvements and commodity price variations and estimate a Pooled Mean Group (PMG) model which enables both 
short term and error correction term coefficients to be country-specific while the long-run relationship is restricted 
to be the same across countries. While analyzing the importance of the resource sector, one may wonder which 
commodities are relevant to include in the study. Different types of commodities trigger their own challenges. Some 
papers restrict their analysis to point-source resources (mainly exhaustible minerals, hydrocarbons, and cash crops) 
which are often easier to control and to extract rents. Exhaustible resources trigger their own challenges regarding 
intergenerational equity and dynamic resource exploitation and management. Another difference may arise 
between capital-intensive and labor-intensive commodities11. While first considering the resource sector as a whole 
in our baseline estimates, we will provide some estimations using different commodity classifications. 
However, commodity-dependent countries are affected heterogeneously by some global factors (US monetary 
policy, the oil price variations, global crisis…) which lead to reject the assumption of cross-section independence in 
the PMG model. As a result, we have carried out our baseline regressions using a Common Correlated Effects Mean 
Group (CCEMG) model which takes into account cross-section dependence. We also provide some robustness checks 
in this analysis. We find a significant positive impact of commodity price variations on export concentration through 
a concentration of already exported products. 
While our previous models have analyzed the overall relationship between commodity price variations and 
diversification developments, we then restrict our analysis to periods of significant commodity price booms and 
busts. We develop a methodology to identify these relevant episodes and analyze the evolution of the diversification 
indicators during these time spans. Countries facing a major commodity price boom have significantly concentrated 
their exports but have diversified during major commodity price busts. While we found evidence of a decrease in the 
manufacturing sector value added share during commodity price booms, we failed to find any significant evolution 
during commodity price drops.  
Comparing the evolution of our diversification indicators during commodity price boom episodes occurring in the 
1970s and in the 2000s we have found a greater concentration of exported products during the 2000s booms than in 
the 1970s which explains partly the current difficulty of undiversified economies to recover in the new context of 
low commodity prices.  
This paper is organized as follows. We first explain the computation of our data before giving some preliminary 
relationships between commodity price variations and the diversification pattern in section 2. Our empirical strategy 
is explained in detail in section 3 from the cointegration relationship, to the common correlated effect model, and 
the commodity price booms and busts analysis. Section 4 thus provides our empirical results before giving some 
policy lessons in section 5. 
9 Authors then relied on indices of resource abundance which is not strictly exogenous and on resource rents whose data are 
scarce and often concentrated on oil production. 
10 The natural rent index of the World Bank database on wealth distribution would have been an alternative but it takes into 
account under the ground resources, does not give estimates for some countries, has a limited time-coverage, and does not 
include mining products such as diamonds which represent a great share of production in economies like Botswana or Central 
African Republic. 
11 Van der Ploeg and Rohner (2012) suggest that the likelihood of a conflict increases with a rise in capital-intensive resources 
(oil, natural gas…) but with a decrease in labor-intensive resources (coffee, rice…)  
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 2. Preliminary data 
 
2.1. Relevant country coverage 
As said above, we restrict our focus on countries dependent on natural resources in order to study the change in 
diversification for countries that should need it the most. We classify countries as dependent on natural resources 
when their share of commodity exports exceeds 40% of total goods and services exports over 2003-200712. While it 
would have been better to get accurate data at the beginning of the time sample in order to select our countries, we 
prefer as a second-best to select countries according to their dependence on natural resources over the period used 
in order to compute their commodity export shares13. 
The resulting sample consists of 78 countries over 1970-201214. While the diversification indices used in this paper 
only cover our sample until 2010, we have used two further years for regressions using the ratio of manufacturing 
value added in order to get more insights for the last years following the 2000s commodity price boom. 
 
2.2. Country specific commodity price indices 
In order to capture country-specific commodity price variations, we compute a Country-Specific Commodity Price 
Index (CSCPI) as a weighted average of commodity prices weighted by the relative importance of each commodity in 
commodities exports over 2003-2007. The commodity export weights cover 53 commodities including 28 food 
products, 6 raw agricultural materials, 15 mining products, and 4 fuel products. We describe the matching between 
trade and commodity price data in appendix 3. 
We rely on the pattern of commodity specialization over 2003-2007 in order to capture the real pattern of 
commodity dependence over 1970-2012. We have selected this period because it was the oldest period for which 
we could get a comprehensive pattern for most of our countries and as a result the most comprehensive data 
coverage. Another possibility would have been to use an index whose commodity weights would have been time-
varying but it would limit the exogeneity of our index. On top of that, while the ratio of commodity dependence may 
have evolved over four decades, we may think that the commodity specialization within the commodity sector 
would not have changed so much. Appendix 4 provides descriptive tables which include these country-specific 
commodity weights for commodities whose weights exceed 5% of the computed basket of exported commodities. 
 
2.3. Diversification patterns 
As explained by Cadot et al (2013), there are three main indicators of diversification in the literature: The Herfindhal 
index, the Theil index, and the Gini index. Even though the Herfindhal index has been often used in empirical studies, 
we have used the Theil index for two main reasons. First, the Theil index can be decomposed in an intensive margin 
diversification index catching the rebalancing of existing product lines and an extensive margin diversification index 
taking into account new product lines, which could provide further insights for our empirical study. Moreover, we 
12 While this threshold may seem ad hoc it stands slightly above the median commodity exports share (30.6%) in order to 
remove some countries only partly dependent on natural resources. It has also been motivated by the slightly higher average 
share of commodity exports share over that period because of higher commodity prices. Appendix 1 provides a geographic 
representation for the share of commodity exports in total goods and services exports over that period. 
13 It is difficult to get relevant estimates for some important product lines such as diamonds and precious stones or non-
monetary gold apart from UNCTAD data which are available from 1995. Moreover, the 2003-2007 period has been selected 
because it maximizes our country coverage, detailed export data being unavailable before for some countries. An alternative 
would have been to use the importance of the natural resource sector value added in total GDP but the discrepancy between 
the ISIC (for value added sectors) and SITC (for exports sectors) prevent us from using it. For instance, numerous partly 
transformed goods classified as agricultural or mining products under the SITC are included in the manufacturing sector (sector 
C) under the ISIC, giving a misleading pattern or resource dependence.  
14 Appendix 4 describes the specialization patterns of these countries, while appendix 2 and 3 explain the methodology behind 
the aggregation of commodity exports, and the matching between trade and price data. 
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benefit from Theil indices originating from the IMF database15 on export concentration constructed thanks to the 
UN-NBER database on trade flows over 1962-2010, which to our knowledge is the database with the largest time and 
country coverage available on export concentration. A higher value of the concentration indices refers to a less 
diversified economy and conversely. 
As a result, this study will cover 5 indicators of diversification: the composite Theil index of export concentration, the 
intensive margin index, the extensive margin index, an index for the quality of exported goods, as well as the 
manufacturing value added share over GDP. While the first three indicators are directly related to export 
diversification, we use the last two in order to get some insights into the impact of commodity price booms on 
quality improvement (proxied by the quality index of exported goods16) and structural transformation (proxied by 
the manufacturing value added share over GDP).  
In order to get some preliminary insights, we present some graphics plotting country-specific Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the log of our indicators and the log of CSCPI during periods of CSCPI increase17 growth against 
the same country-specific correlation coefficients under periods of CSCPI drops18.  
We should remind that our export concentration indices and its extensive and intensive margin components are 
coded so that a lower value corresponds to a higher level of diversification. In graphs 1.a 1.b and 1.c, countries in the 
top-left corner would have concentrated their exports both in periods of commodity price increase and decrease, 
countries in the bottom-right corner would have diversified their exports in both periods, countries in the bottom-
left corner would have diversified their exports during commodity price increases and concentrated their exports 
during commodity price decreases, while countries in the top-right corner would have diversified their exports 
during commodity price decreases and concentrated their exports during commodity price increases. 
At first sight, a sizable number of countries are situated in the top-right corner which means that those countries 
have diversified their exports during bad periods and concentrated during good periods even though the pattern is 
mixed for the extensive margin index.  
Regarding graphs 1.d and 1.e, the interpretation should be the reverse so that countries having increased the 
relative quality or the manufacturing value-added share in both periods are now situated in the top-left corner and 
countries having decreased the relative quality or the manufacturing value-added share in both periods are in the 
bottom-right corner. Even though some heterogeneity exists in graph 1.d, half of our countries are located in the 
bottom-left corner for the quality index which means they would have increased the overall relative quality of their 
exports during commodity price decreases and decreased it during price increases. Graph 1.e concerning the 
manufacturing value-added share depicts no clear pattern and warrants deeper analysis. 
 
15 See IMF (2014) for further details regarding the data. 
16 This index originates from the same IMF diversification database and has been constructed thanks to adjusted export unit 
values in relative terms so that the quality of exported goods is expressed relative to the world 90th percentile of quality for each 
exported good. See Henn et al (2013) for further details. 
17 A positive correlation coefficient during commodity price increases means an increase of the concentration index, that is to 
say a decrease in diversification, which corresponds to observations at the top of the graph.  
18 A positive correlation coefficient during commodity price drops means a decrease of the concentration index, that is to say an 
increase in diversification, which corresponds to observations on the right-hand side of the graph. 
Études et documents n° 15, CERDI, 2016
10
 Graph 1.a: Simple correlation coefficients between the concentration index and the CSCPI during CSCPI 
growth and drops 
Graph 1.b: Simple correlation coefficients between the intensive margin index and the CSCPI during CSCPI 
growth and drops 
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Graph 1.d: Simple correlation coefficients between the exports quality index and the CSCPI during CSCPI 
growth and drops 
Graph 1.c: Simple correlation coefficients between the extensive margin index and the CSCPI during CSCPI 
growth and drops 
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3. Empirical strategy 
 
3.1. Cointegration analysis 
A first step in the analysis could be to assess the non-stationarity properties of our main variables of interest leaving 
aside for the moment other control variables. In this section we will only focus on the concentration index (Conc 
Index) because it is our main proxy and we will study its relationship with the growth rates of commodity prices both 
in the short run and in the long run. We assess these properties with both Maddala and Wu (1999) and Pesaran 
(2007) tests. This latter improves on other panel unit root tests by taking into account potential cross-section 
dependence which may arise in our data due to common global shocks and cross-section spillovers. As a result, we 
will guide our analysis thanks to the Pesaran CIPS test. 
Then we will be able to provide cointegration tests thanks to Westerlund (2007) that takes into account short-term 
country-heterogeneity as well as country-specific speed of adjustment in the cointegration relationship. In order to 
estimate the cointegration relationship, we will make use of the Pooled-Mean-Group (PMG) estimator developed by 
Pesaran et al (1999). This estimator improves on the Mean-Group (MG) estimator developed by Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) in that it restricts the long-run relationship to be homogenous across individuals, while enabling country-
specific short-run responses and speeds of adjustment.  





+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1)⁡ 
Let equation (1) represent our PMG specification with ∅𝑖 a vector of country-specific error correction terms 
expected to be significantly negative, 𝜃′ the long-run estimated coefficient, 𝛿𝑖𝑗
′  a vector of country-specific short-run 
coefficients to be estimated, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and error term. The homogeneity of the long-run relationship is not 
straightforward especially with a panel of countries with heterogeneous levels of development and heterogeneous 
commodity specialization patterns. As a result, we will estimate the MG relationship for each specification and 
perform a Hausman test of the non-systematic difference between the coefficients of both models. If we fail to 
Graph 1.e: Simple correlation coefficients between the manufacturing VA share and the CSCPI during 
CSCPI growth and drops 
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reject the non-difference between the estimated parameters, it will validate the choice of the PMG estimator. We 
have included the contemporaneous commodity price variation as well as its first lag in order to control for potential 
lags in the relationship. 
Even though we could only estimate a PMG model and check the aggregate significance of the speed of adjustment 
as a check of a cointegration relationship, we perform the Westerlund (2007) test for each specification and report 
the 4 statistics19. 
Because we are aware of the heterogeneity in commodity specialization, we group countries according to their type 
of specialization. As a result, a country belongs to one of the 4 groups; food exporters (food), raw agricultural 
materials exporters (rawagri), mining products exporters (mining), or energy exporters (energy), when its exports of 
commodities belonging to this group has exceeded 20% of total goods and services exports over 2003-200720. We 
will provide PMG estimates as well as the associated tests for these 4 groups of countries, as well as a 5th group 
named as exhaustible which gathers countries whose exports of exhaustible commodities (proxied by the sum of 
mining and energy exports) exceeds 20%. There are numerous reasons for analyzing specifically this category 
because the commodities belonging to it are often more capital intensive, more point-source and more prone to 
rent-grabbing, as well as facing the challenge of exhaustibility. 
 
3.2. Common correlated effects estimates 
Even though the PMG estimator provides an efficiency improvement in comparison with traditional estimators, it 
fails to account for cross-section dependence which may arise because of common global shocks or spillovers 
between countries. This problem is all the most striking in our case because of the impact of global shocks on 
commodity price markets (US monetary policy, oil price variations, global financial crisis…). In order to control for 
these common factors that both affect our dependent and independent variables, Pesaran (2006) has developed a 
Common Correlated Effects (CCE) model which is a Mean-Group type of estimator so that it can be defined as a 
Mean-Group Common Correlated Effects (CCE) model. 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡⁡(2) 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ⁡⁡(2)′ 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼2𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖𝐹𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐺𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ⁡⁡(2)′′ 
Let equation (2) represent our main equation with 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 a vector of explanatory variables, 𝛽𝑖 a vector of country-
specific coefficients, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 our dependent variable, and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 containing the unobservable factors. In this model, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 can 
be explained in equation (2)’ as a function of unobserved common factors 𝐹𝑡 with heterogeneous factor loadings 𝜆𝑖. 
Similarly, the vector of explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 can be described in (2’’) as a function of the same unobserved 
common factors 𝐹𝑡 and another set of unobserved common factors 𝐺𝑡 with 𝛾𝑖  being the heterogeneous factor 
loadings related to 𝐺𝑡. Let 𝛼1𝑖 and  𝛼2𝑖 represent country-specific constants, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 are the error terms. 
With the same functioning as the Mean-Group estimator, it estimates the relationship for each cross-section and 
averages the resulting coefficients 𝛽𝑖 across individuals. We will use a version of the MGCCE estimator which is 
robust to potential outliers and gives a weighted average of each coefficients21. In order to control for the common 
global factors that affect the independent and the dependent variables in every country but with different strength 
as highlighted in equations (2)’ and (2)’’, the model augments the cross-section regressions with cross-section 
averages of the dependent and independent variables.  
19 Gt and Ga are statistics based on group-mean and test against the alternative hypothesis of at least one cointegration 
relationship among our countries, while the panel Pt and Pa statistics are built on the alternative hypothesis of a cointegration 
relationship for the panel as a whole. 
20 As such a country can belong to multiple groups such as Central African Republic which is considered both in the mining group 
and in the raw agricultural material group. Countries can also belong to no group if their commodity exports are split between 
each groups and fall below the threshold (Togo, Kyrgyzstan). 
21 This seems important in our study because while the IMF database has been implemented with great care, we cannot rule out 
completely the possibility of some swings in our indices related to customs methodology changes, changes of goods 
classification, a change in the taxation of exports (or imports because some trade figures were built thanks to mirror data). 
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This estimator presents the best trade-off in order to estimate the impact of commodity price variations on our 
diversification related variables, and will use it as our benchmark. The estimations have been carried out for each of 
the 5 dependent indicators of export diversification presented previously.  
Unlike the previous section, we will introduce some control variables in the model. We will distinguish two types of 
control variables: permanent control variables which would appear in each specification and potential control 
variables which are introduced to check the stability of the main specification.  
∆ ln(𝐷𝑖𝑣)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖∆ ln(𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑖∆ ln(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖 ln(𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹⁡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖 ln(𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5,𝑖𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ⁡⁡   (3)  
Let equation (3) refers to our main empirical specification.⁡∆ ln(𝐷𝑖𝑣)𝑖,𝑡 refers to the diff-log form for alternatively 
each of our 5 dependent variables related to diversification: the concentration index (Conc Index), the intensive 
margin index (Int margin), the extensive margin index (Ext margin), the relative quality index (Quality Index), and the 
manufacturing value-added share (Manu share). Our main interest coefficient 𝛽1,𝑖 is related to commodity price 
variations proxied by the diff-log form of commodity prices ∆ ln(𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑖,𝑡. In specifications using the diversification 
indices, a positive value for 𝛽1,𝑖 would mean that commodity price variations evolve in the same direction as export 
concentration22, while a negative value for 𝛽1,𝑖 would mean that commodity price variations evolve in the same 
direction as export diversification. 
Our core of permanent control variables consists of Real Effective Exchange Rate ∆ln(REER) variations23, the stock of 
human capital ln(School) proxied by the secondary school enrollment ratio (WDI) 24, as well as the stock of 
infrastructure ln(GFCF share) proxied by the share of gross fixed capital formation in total GDP (UNSTAT)25. This 
specification gives us 2 potential long-run determinants of the diversification pattern which are expressed in log, and 
two shorter-term determinants which are expressed in diff-log. The inclusion of REER variations is especially 
important because economists have evidenced for years a relationship between commodity price booms and REER 
appreciation triggered by increased domestic spending following the commodity price boom, and which 
progressively increases the price of tradable goods relative to non-tradable goods. Using variations of REER in our 
specification we control for this Dutch disease related spending channel so that the estimated coefficients on CSCPI 
variations could be interpreted as a direct effect of commodity price booms on the diversification indicator. 
In order to confirm the validity of our results, we introduce one by one alternative control variables 𝐶𝑖,𝑡. This 
includes the volatility of commodity prices vol(CSCPI)26, the country labor market size ln(pop active) proxied by the 
stock of active population (WDI), the ratio of goods and services imports over GDP ln (
𝑀
𝐺𝐷𝑃
) as a proxy for trade 
openness27, the financial development ln(financial dev) proxied by the ratio of liquid liabilities per inhabitants (World 
Bank Financial Development Structure Database), the Chinn-Ito index of capital openness rescaled to be bound 
22 We should keep in mind that a positive coefficient could be either the sign of export concentration during commodity price 
increases or export diversification during commodity price decreases. 
23 See appendix 5 for an explanation of the REER computation. 
24 Because of gaps in the data we have used the moving average using 4 lags and the contemporaneous data in our 
specifications in log, while we will refer to the original index for the ∆ln specifications.  
25 While imperfect, this proxy controls for the importance of capital investments which could be targeted towards energy supply, 
transport infrastructure, or telecommunication infrastructures, which are crucial to open new business activities. 
26 These series are computed as conditional standard deviations from a GARCH(1,1) model on monthly CSCPI series and 
averaged by year. 
27 We may expect a will to import a variety of products which could trigger export diversification. It may also catch some 
evolution of trade policies over time. The results remained apparently the same with the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP 
but we feel that the ratio of imports to GDP has more theoretical justifications. 
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between 0 and 1 ln(capital open)28, the polity 2 index (Polity IV) rescaled to be bound between 0 and 1 
ln(democracy)29, and the log level of PPP GDP per capita ln(PPP GDP pc)30 (WEO). 
 
3.3. Selection of commodity price episodes 
While the estimation of the CCEMG model will give us some great empirical insights into the relationship between 
commodity price variations and the evolution of the diversification pattern, these estimates have been carried out 
on every data observation. However, we may think that only periods of strong commodity price increase (defined as 
boom episodes) or strong commodity price drop (defined as bust episodes) should be relevant to study.  
As such, we will provide some insights into the evolution of the diversification related indicators during the 
commodity price episodes defined previously. This strategy will enable us to catch longer-run impacts of commodity 
price booms/busts on diversification outcomes especially through the evolution of capital expenditure or human 
capital. However, it would have been better to compare pre-boom/bust and post-boom/bust periods to gauge their 
impact on diversification but we lack data observations before the 1970s boom and after the 2000s boom31. 
Our first task consists in identifying episodes of commodity price booms and busts in order to select periods in which 
the commodity price variations have impacted the most our selected countries. As a result, we benefit from the 
Country Specific Commodity Price Indices computed as described previously in order to identify these episodes. 
A first methodology could have been to extract a stochastic cyclical component from our CSCPI series thanks to time-
series filtering methodologies. However, filtering methodologies have been mostly used for identifying business 
cycle variations. One major difference between business cycles and commodity price cycles relies in the longer-
duration of commodity price cycles which complicates the identification of commodity price cycles on our covered 
period of 41 years32. Moreover, filtering methodologies often perform poorly at both the beginning and the end of 
the time period, that is to say when we would need the most to identify episodes related to the 1970s and 2000s 
commodity price booms33. Thus, we relied on CSCPI variations directly in order to classify commodity price episodes. 
We did not rely on direct growth rates from our CSCPI series because our empirical strategies will use some log or 
diff-log forms of our CSCPI series. As a result, we will consider hereafter commodity price growth as the difference 
between consecutive CSCPI observations in log forms. 
First, we compute a positive cumulative price shock (Cumshock) which is the product of current plus past commodity 
price increases since the last commodity price drop. Alternatively, a negative cumulative price shock corresponds to 
the product of current plus past commodity price drops since the last commodity price increase. 
28 Capital openness can proxy the openness to FDI flows which can bring about new technologies and knowledge necessary in 
order to process new activities. Moreover, the liberalization of FDI inputs can provide huge efficiency gains for the domestic 
economy. However, capital openness can enable brutal capital reversals with its domestic destabilizing impacts. 
29 This proxy is far from perfectly catching the quality of institutions but it is really challenging to get a proxy for the quality of 
institutions with enough within variations which dates back to the 1970s. We have taken the polity2 indicator as a second best 
because it proxies above all political institutional output. It may control for the different determinants of capital investments 
and business operation between more democratic regimes and more autocratic regimes. 
30This latter is a standard determinant of exports diversification in the literature motivated by the early empirical focus on the 
relationship between the level of economic development and export diversification. However, the level of development is too 
much correlated with relevant determinants such as the financial development (0.75), capital openness (0.54), or the school 
enrollment ratio (0.76) which complicates its inclusion among our key control variables, and leads us to include it only as a 
robustness check.  
31 The identified start of the 1970s commodity price boom has often been set to 1970 because we lack past data for some 
commodities while the boom may have started earlier. 
32 Burns and Mitchell (1946) defined standard business cycle variations as lasting from 1.5 to 8 years which correspond to 
commonly adopted parameters in filtering methodologies. However, commodity price cycles often referred as commodity price 
super-cycles seem to last between 20 and 70 years (Erten and Ocampo, 2013). 
33 Even though only the Baxter and King (1999) filter induces some loss of observation because it relies on moving averages, 
other filters like the Band-Pass Christiano and Fitzgerald (2013) or the High-Pass Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filters perform poorly at 
both ends of the sample. We tried both methodologies as well as the Butterworth (1930) methodology each with different 
parameters but it provided irrelevant commodity price episode selections. 
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Then we select commodity boom episodes when the peak positive cumulative price shock belongs to the top 10% of 
positive cumulative price shocks. Alternatively, we select commodity price bust episodes when the peak negative 
cumulative price shock belongs to the top 10% of negative cumulative price shocks34. While able to select continuous 
booms and busts this selection overlook some quick reversal of commodity price variations before a continuation of 
previous commodity price increase or drop. 
To tackle this problem, we test for each year whether our adjusted cumulative commodity price shocks between the 
beginning and the end of the tested period still remain above the selected threshold of cumulative commodity price 
shocks. We perform these tests for years earlier and beyond the first selected period until the adjusted cumulative 
commodity price shock fall below the threshold. While this modification catches more relevant episodes it extends 
our selection of episodes further than necessary so we restrict the time periods from troughs to peaks or conversely. 
 The resulting sample presented in table 1 and 2 consists of 94 commodity price booms episodes in 56 countries and 
of 77 commodity price busts episodes in 68 countries.  
  
34 While one could think this threshold would poorly select commodity price episodes, we should remind that 10% of positive 
(negative) commodity price observations consists approximatively of 5% of our data sample because cumulative price shocks 
observation only includes positive (negative) commodity price variations. Moreover, some episodes include multiple 
observations of cumulative commodity price shocks above our threshold which incited us to select a less binding threshold. The 
threshold values for the cumulative shock are respectively +84.3% and -44.2%. 
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Country Cumshock Beginning End Duration Country Cumshock Beginning End Duration 
Algeria 325.1% 1970 1980 11 Kyrgyzstan 189.0% 1999 2011 13 
Algeria 283.5% 1998 2008 11 Libya 328.2% 1970 1980 11 
Angola 319.8% 1970 1980 11 Libya 329.3% 1998 2008 11 
Angola 325.3% 1998 2008 11 Mali 105.8% 1970 1974 5 
Argentina 93.0% 1970 1974 5 Mauritania 225.7% 2002 2010 9 
Argentina 108.6% 1999 2008 10 Mongolia 224.6% 2001 2011 11 
Australia 165.2% 1999 2011 13 Myanmar 104.0% 1970 1974 5 
Azerbaijan 293.7% 1970 1980 11 Niger 89.4% 1970 1974 5 
Azerbaijan 293.9% 1998 2008 11 Nigeria 325.6% 1970 1980 11 
Bahrain 155.3% 1998 2008 11 Nigeria 323.4% 1998 2008 11 
Bhutan 148.0% 2001 2008 8 Norway 270.6% 1970 1980 11 
Bolivia 183.6% 1970 1980 11 Norway 241.4% 1998 2008 11 
Bolivia 158.9% 1999 2008 10 Oman 320.1% 1970 1980 11 
Brazil 98.2% 2002 2008 7 Oman 306.6% 1998 2008 11 
Brunei 329.9% 1970 1980 11 Papua New Guinea 102.9% 1971 1974 4 
Brunei 289.0% 1998 2008 11 Papua New Guinea 194.7% 2001 2011 11 
Burkina Faso 89.8% 2009 2011 3 Peru 95.5% 1971 1974 4 
Burundi 199.8% 2001 2011 11 Peru 199.3% 2002 2011 10 
Cameroon 106.7% 1970 1974 5 Qatar 330.3% 1970 1980 11 
Cameroon 160.6% 1998 2011 14 Qatar 289.0% 1998 2008 11 
Chad 272.3% 1970 1980 11 Republic of Congo 272.7% 1970 1980 11 
Chad 235.9% 1998 2008 11 Republic of Congo 281.8% 1998 2008 11 
Chile 167.1% 2002 2011 10 Russia 248.3% 1970 1980 11 
Colombia 228.5% 1970 1980 11 Russia 247.8% 1998 2008 11 
Colombia 158.3% 1998 2008 11 Saudi Arabia 325.0% 1970 1980 11 
Cote d'Ivoire 108.3% 1971 1974 4 Saudi Arabia 325.7% 1998 2008 11 
Cote d'Ivoire 104.9% 1999 2008 10 Senegal 102.9% 1970 1974 5 
Ecuador 198.9% 1970 1980 11 Sudan 283.7% 1970 1980 11 
Ecuador 178.3% 1998 2008 11 Sudan 270.6% 1998 2008 11 
Equatorial Guinea 323.7% 1970 1980 11 Syria 246.8% 1970 1980 11 
Equatorial Guinea 324.2% 1998 2008 11 Syria 246.2% 1998 2008 11 
Ethiopia 96.8% 2001 2008 8 Togo 101.2% 1970 1974 5 
Gabon 250.6% 1970 1980 11 Togo 116.1% 2001 2008 8 
Gabon 254.9% 1998 2008 11 Trinidad and Tobago 297.4% 1970 1980 11 
Ghana 91.2% 1971 1974 4 Trinidad and Tobago 243.8% 1998 2008 11 
Guyana 108.1% 1971 1974 4 Turkmenistan 312.1% 1970 1980 11 
Indonesia 103.1% 1972 1974 3 Turkmenistan 205.4% 1998 2008 11 
Indonesia 151.7% 1999 2008 10 United Arab Emirates 283.2% 1970 1980 11 
Iran 307.5% 1970 1980 11 United Arab Emirates 259.7% 1998 2008 11 
Iran 319.0% 1998 2008 11 Uzbekistan 84.3% 2002 2008 7 
Iraq 327.9% 1970 1980 11 Venezuela 300.0% 1970 1980 11 
Iraq 337.6% 1998 2008 11 Venezuela 306.9% 1998 2008 11 
Kazakhstan 220.2% 1970 1980 11 Vietnam 111.7% 1970 1974 5 
Kazakhstan 275.8% 1998 2008 11 Vietnam 117.6% 2002 2008 7 
Kuwait 316.0% 1970 1980 11 Yemen 313.4% 1970 1980 11 
Kuwait 314.3% 1998 2008 11 Yemen 302.1% 1998 2008 11 
Kyrgyzstan 113.3% 1970 1974 5 Zambia 193.2% 2002 2011 10 
 
  
Table 1: Commodity price boom episodes 
Cumshock: Refers to the cumulative price growth from the beginning to the end of each episode 
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Country Cumshock Beginning End Duration Country Cumshock Beginning End Duration 
Algeria -86.6% 1980 1998 19 Libya -90.5% 1980 1998 19 
Angola -90.8% 1980 1998 19 Mali -44.2% 1995 1999 5 
Armenia -61.6% 1979 1986 8 Mauritania -86.4% 1973 2002 30 
Armenia -50.4% 1988 1993 6 Mongolia -45.7% 1995 1999 5 
Australia -51.2% 1980 1986 7 Mozambique -48.1% 1979 1982 4 
Azerbaijan -88.5% 1980 1998 19 Mozambique -51.0% 1988 1993 6 
Bahrain -44.3% 1983 1986 4 Myanmar -70.4% 1979 2002 24 
Benin -45.4% 1983 1986 4 Namibia -45.5% 1988 1993 6 
Bhutan -44.9% 1974 1975 2 New Zealand -48.3% 1979 1985 7 
Bhutan -44.4% 1979 1982 4 Niger -76.0% 1979 1998 20 
Bhutan -48.3% 1995 2001 7 Nigeria -90.1% 1980 1998 19 
Bolivia -78.7% 1980 1999 20 Norway -84.8% 1980 1998 19 
Botswana -85.0% 1974 2003 30 Oman -88.5% 1980 1998 19 
Brunei -87.0% 1980 1998 19 Qatar -87.0% 1980 1998 19 
Burkina Faso -87.2% 1974 2002 29 Republic of Congo -87.5% 1980 1998 19 
Burundi -88.2% 1977 2001 25 Russia -83.2% 1980 1998 19 
Cameroon -77.7% 1979 1998 20 Saudi Arabia -90.2% 1980 1998 19 
Central African Republic -59.9% 1979 1985 7 Senegal -74.3% 1979 2002 24 
Chad -88.3% 1980 1998 19 Sierra Leone -84.4% 1977 2003 27 
Chile -45.7% 1995 1999 5 Solomon Islands -58.0% 1977 1985 9 
Colombia -77.0% 1980 1998 19 Sudan -87.1% 1980 1998 19 
Cote d'Ivoire -46.1% 1979 1982 4 Suriname -52.1% 1980 1982 3 
Dem. Rep. of Congo -75.9% 1979 2002 24 Suriname -53.5% 1988 1993 6 
Ecuador -79.8% 1980 1998 19 Syria -85.4% 1980 1998 19 
Equatorial Guinea -90.3% 1980 1998 19 Tajikistan -54.3% 1979 1982 4 
Ethiopia -90.5% 1977 2001 25 Tajikistan -59.0% 1988 1993 6 
Gabon -85.4% 1980 1998 19 Togo -75.8% 1974 2001 28 
Ghana -84.7% 1977 2000 24 Trinidad and Tobago -84.2% 1980 1998 19 
Guinea -52.0% 1980 1982 3 Turkmenistan -85.3% 1980 1998 19 
Guinea -55.0% 1988 1993 6 Uganda -86.0% 1977 2002 26 
Guyana -77.3% 1980 2002 23 United Arab Emirates -86.4% 1980 1998 19 
Iceland -50.1% 1973 1975 3 Uruguay -71.3% 1979 2001 23 
Iceland -72.5% 1988 2002 15 Venezuela -88.9% 1980 1998 19 
Indonesia -75.1% 1979 1999 21 Vietnam -75.0% 1980 1998 19 
Iran -89.7% 1980 1998 19 Yemen -89.4% 1980 1998 19 
Iraq -91.2% 1980 1998 19 Zambia -87.3% 1974 2002 29 
Kazakhstan -85.3% 1980 1998 19 Zimbabwe -47.8% 1980 1986 7 
Kenya -75.2% 1977 2002 26 Zimbabwe -46.4% 1989 1993 5 
Kuwait -89.3% 1980 1998 19           
 
  
Table 2: Commodity price bust episodes 
Cumshock: Refers to the cumulative price growth from the beginning to the end of each episode 
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4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Cointegration analysis 
 
To begin with, table 3 provides some estimates of panel unit root tests on our interest variables using the Maddala 
and Wu (1999) test and the cross-section dependence robust Pesaran (2007) test. Thanks to dynamic unreported 
results we have set the number of lags to 2 without a trend for CSCPI and to 1 for our concentration index with a 
trend. 
While the results unanimously fail to reject the unit root hypothesis for ln(CSCPI), the results are mixed for our 
concentration index. In fact, the Maddala and Wu test (1999) rejects the presence of a unit root test, while the 
Pesaran test fails to reject the unit root hypothesis on the specification with trend but reject it on the specification 
without trend. Due to the significance of a trend in the concentration index data process and to the importance of 
cross-section dependence35 in our sample we rely on the estimates that fails to reject the hypothesis of a unit root 
even though it is the only reported result which do so.  
 
Variable 
With trend Without trend 
Maddala and Wu 
(1999) 
Pesaran (2007) 
Maddala and Wu 
(1999) 
Pesaran (2007) 
Chi² P-Value Zt-bar P-Value Chi² P-Value Zt-bar P-Value 
ln(Conc Index) 201.884 0.002 -1.129 0.129 216.822 0.000 -3.145 0.001 
ln(CSCPI) 73.408 1.000 1.656 0.951 120.119 0.955 3.196 0.999 
We now turn our attention to the estimation of the potential cointegration relationship on different country 
grouping in table 4. For every specification we fail to reject the difference between the coefficients estimated thanks 
to the MG model and those estimated with the PMG which seems to validate the hypothesis of long-run coefficients 
homogeneity. Regarding the Westerlund cointegration tests, it is striking to realize that we reject the hypothesis of 
no cointegration for the whole panel for our main regression as well as with our energy and exhaustible equations. 
However, we fail to reject the no cointegration hypothesis for the 4 test statistics with the food, raw agricultural 
materials and mining groupings.  
When looking at the PMG estimates, we remark that the speed of adjustment is significantly negative which is the 
sign of a strong reversion towards the long-run relationship36. Moreover, the long run coefficient for the CSCPI 
variations is always significantly positive apart from the raw agricultural materials estimation. Regarding the short-
run impact of CSCPI variations we find a significant positive impact aside from raw agricultural materials and mining 
regressions, while the lagged variations are only significant twice and have an impact from two to three times 
weaker on the concentration index. As a result, we won’t introduce lagged variations of CSCPI in the analysis and will 
keep on with the contemporaneous variation. We could also note that only for the energy category the short run 
coefficient exceeds the long run coefficient but this point necessitates further analysis in order to deduce something 
consistent about it. 
To sum up, commodity dependent countries have experienced both a short-run and a long-run relationship which 
leads to a concentration of exports following a commodity price increase or a diversification of exports following a 
35 We have performed some unreported Pesaran (2004) tests which strongly reject the hypothesis of cross-section 
independence in our panel.  
36 The speed of adjustment -0.223 in the main specification corresponds to a duration of 2.75 years in order to eliminate 50% of 
an exogenous shock (often referred as the half-life) and 5.49 years in order to eliminate 75%. 
Table 3: Panel unit root tests 
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commodity price drop. However, as evidenced by our results this effect may be triggered by producers of 
exhaustible resources, especially hydrocarbon producers.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Main Food Rawagri Mining Energy Exhaustible 
LR 
ln(CSCPI) 0.063*** 0.098*** -0.062 0.117*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 
  (7.796) (7.454) (-1.408) (6.430) (4.785) (6.073) 
SR 
ECt-1 -0.223*** -0.266*** -0.298*** -0.272*** -0.219*** -0.228*** 
  (-9.981) (-6.280) (-7.034) (-6.071) (-6.161) (-8.320) 
∆ln(CSCPI)t 0.049*** 0.043** -0.006 0.014 0.063*** 0.048*** 
  (4.806) (2.243) (-0.232) (0.562) (6.240) (4.203) 
∆ln(CSCPI)t-1 -0.008 -0.022** -0.022 -0.039 0.020*** 0.002 
  (-0.775) (-2.011) (-1.001) (-1.432) (2.988) (0.161) 
Constant 0.250*** 0.217*** 0.527*** 0.234*** 0.294*** 0.287*** 
  (9.058) (4.849) (6.580) (5.312) (6.055) (7.916) 
N 2692 797 213 777 1316 1976 
N of countries 74 21 6 21 36 54 
Hausman (P-Value) 0.346 0.337 1.000 0.186 0.174 0.598 
Westerlund Gt stat (P-Value) 0.071 0.104 0.627 0.455 0.009 0.045 
Westerlund Ga stat (P-Value) 0.806 0.681 0.840 0.915 0.236 0.664 
Westerlund Pt stat (P-Value) 0.000 0.252 0.177 0.143 0.000 0.000 
Westerlund Pa stat (P-Value) 0.001 0.235 0.304 0.261 0.000 0.001 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
4.2. Common correlated effects estimators 
4.2.1. Main estimations 
While the previous section has evidenced a positive relationship between commodity price variations and export 
concentration both in the short run and in the long run, this model fails to take into account the global common 
factors impacting differently every country through both dependent and independent variables of our model, which 
motivates the analysis of our CCEMG results. 
In table 5.1, we find a strongly significant positive and stable impact of CSCPI variations on the evolution of our 
export concentration index across every specification. The average coefficient of 0.118 across our 7 columns show 
that a 10% increase in commodity prices is associated to a slightly more than 1% increase in export concentration37. 
Even though this quantitative impact may seem low, we should remind that it corresponds only to the 
contemporaneous response to commodity price variations. The analysis of commodity price booms and busts 
episodes in next section will take into account longer-run effects on diversification. We should also note that REER 
appreciation and a decrease in the GFCF share are also slightly linked with export concentration.  
The pattern is quite identical regarding estimates based on the intensive margin index in table 5.2 but with a more 
salient impact of REER appreciations. However, in table 5.3 CSCPI variations only impact the extensive margin index 
37 The interpretation could also be reversed with a 10% decrease in commodity prices being associated with a slightly more than 
1% decrease in export concentration (or increase in export diversification). 
Table 4: Pool Mean Group (PMG) estimations 
𝐸𝐶𝑡−1: Error correction term 
Hausman (P-Value): P-Value for the Hausman test of the non-systematic difference between the coefficients for the MG and PMG estimates. 
The upper part of the table refers to the long-run relationship (LR) while the bottom part refers to the short run coefficients (SR). 
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when the financial development is included in the regression, while improvements in the stock of human capital 
seem to be the main determinants of extensive diversification, that is to say the creation of new exports lines. 
Finally, our model fails to explain correctly the variations of the relative quality of exported goods in table 5.4 as well 
as the evolution of the manufacturing value-added share in table 5.5, even though we find some consistent impact 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Conc index) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.113*** 0.119*** 0.089*** 0.114*** 0.138*** 
  (5.333) (5.999) (5.322) (4.026) (3.887) (4.651) (5.624) 
∆ln(REER) 0.030** 0.019 0.028* 0.040** 0.021 0.016 0.039** 
  (2.272) (1.338) (1.927) (2.142) (1.365) (1.144) (2.221) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.013* -0.013* -0.010 -0.017** -0.003 -0.011 -0.005 
  (-1.900) (-1.693) (-1.088) (-2.064) (-0.362) (-1.181) (-0.695) 
ln(School) -0.018 -0.020 -0.033** -0.028 -0.024 0.003 -0.020 
  (-1.633) (-1.136) (-2.123) (-1.337) (-1.381) (0.187) (-1.275) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.003        
  (-1.442)        
ln(Pop active)  0.009       





  -0.020*      
    (-1.718)      
ln(Financial dev)    0.003     
     (0.368)     
Capital open     0.012    
      (0.822)    
Democracy level      -0.017   
       (-1.339)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.038** 
        (2.037) 
N 2386 2383 2386 2009 2190 2310 2272 
N of countries 72 72 72 70 72 71 72 
Wald Chi² 41.958 41.980 40.676 26.980 19.685 26.168 42.822 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
  
Table 5.a: Mean-Group Common-correlated effects (CCEMG) estimates for the concentration index 
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Int margin) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.089*** 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.122*** 0.098*** 0.114*** 0.117*** 
  (3.553) (4.706) (4.530) (4.300) (4.391) (4.549) (4.250) 
∆ln(REER) 0.053*** 0.031* 0.047** 0.054*** 0.017 0.023 0.035** 
  (3.309) (1.798) (2.510) (2.960) (0.979) (1.329) (2.114) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.014* -0.012 -0.018 -0.016 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 
  (-1.950) (-1.515) (-1.442) (-1.638) (-0.676) (-1.042) (-1.382) 
ln(School) 0.019 0.031 0.040* -0.028 -0.002 0.033* 0.012 
  (1.178) (1.229) (1.932) (-1.088) (-0.092) (1.813) (0.639) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.005*        
  (-1.733)        
ln(Pop active)  0.122**       





  -0.013      
    (-0.771)      
ln(Financial dev)    0.001     
     (0.149)     
Capital open     0.029    
      (1.092)    
Democracy level      -0.017   
       (-1.166)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.023 
        (0.980) 
N 2386 2383 2386 2009 2190 2310 2272 
N of countries 72 72 72 70 72 71 72 
Wald Chi² 31.766 34.782 33.229 31.141 21.892 28.189 25.812 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
  
Table 5.b: Mean-Group Common-correlated effects (CCEMG) estimates for the intensive margin index 
The constant is not reported in the table above 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Ext margin) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.100 0.042 0.034 0.260*** 0.043 0.034 0.078 
  (1.291) (0.411) (0.400) (3.683) (0.601) (0.470) (0.873) 
∆ln(REER) -0.062 -0.089* -0.044 -0.073 -0.058 -0.087* -0.058 
  (-1.098) (-1.709) (-0.867) (-1.311) (-0.937) (-1.774) (-1.186) 
ln(GFCFshare) 0.020 0.030 -0.018 -0.042 -0.024 -0.007 0.014 
  (0.443) (0.704) (-0.424) (-0.846) (-0.722) (-0.133) (0.440) 
ln(School) -0.163** -0.150** -0.163** -0.177* -0.114** -0.248*** -0.087 
  (-2.304) (-2.099) (-2.258) (-1.793) (-2.378) (-3.158) (-1.344) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.019        
  (-1.374)        
ln(Pop active)  -0.416*       





  -0.039      
    (-0.620)      
ln(Financial dev)    -0.002     
     (-0.062)     
Capital open     0.045    
      (0.736)    
Democracy level      -0.062   
       (-0.949)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.014 
        (0.098) 
N 2317 2314 2317 1965 2135 2244 2210 
N of countries 72 72 72 69 72 71 72 
Wald Chi² 10.267 11.049 6.573 19.217 7.957 14.262 4.178 





Table 5.c: Mean-Group Common-correlated effects (CCEMG) estimates for the extensive margin index 
The constant is not reported in the table above 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Quality index) 
∆ln(CSCPI) -0.037* -0.031 -0.004 -0.019 -0.029 -0.007 -0.013 
  (-1.927) (-1.354) (-0.184) (-0.764) (-1.224) (-0.321) (-0.539) 
∆ln(REER) -0.020 -0.011 -0.018 -0.012 -0.022 -0.013 -0.007 
  (-1.361) (-0.631) (-1.256) (-0.575) (-1.209) (-0.896) (-0.497) 
ln(GFCFshare) 0.011* 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.025*** 0.007 
  (1.785) (1.403) (1.579) (1.487) (0.343) (2.779) (0.884) 
ln(School) -0.008 0.014 -0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.009 0.015 
  (-0.622) (0.956) (-0.080) (0.079) (0.246) (-0.587) (0.958) 
vol(CSCPI) 0.005*        
  (1.655)        
ln(Pop active)  -0.036       





  0.013      
    (1.197)      
ln(Financial dev)    -0.007     
     (-0.727)     
Capital open     0.004    
      (0.207)    
Democracy level      0.021   
       (1.134)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       -0.005 
        (-0.201) 
N 2279 2276 2279 1909 2106 2204 2192 
N of countries 72 72 72 70 72 71 72 
Wald Chi² 11.874 5.660 5.544 3.661 3.179 10.256 2.277 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
  
Table 5.d: Mean-Group Common-correlated effects (CCEMG) estimates for the relative quality index 
The constant is not reported in the table above 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Manu share) 
∆ln(CSCPI) -0.024 -0.023 -0.040 -0.039 -0.048 -0.024 -0.039 
  (-0.826) (-0.689) (-1.229) (-0.977) (-1.307) (-0.744) (-1.038) 
∆ln(REER) -0.060* -0.068* -0.040 -0.062 -0.077* -0.034 -0.101** 
  (-1.751) (-1.789) (-1.244) (-1.176) (-1.660) (-0.915) (-2.552) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.009 0.010 -0.019 -0.043* -0.037 -0.005 0.001 
  (-0.485) (0.512) (-0.693) (-1.839) (-1.617) (-0.237) (0.048) 
ln(School) 0.011 0.059* -0.004 -0.003 0.026 0.014 0.014 
  (0.352) (1.687) (-0.111) (-0.086) (0.662) (0.401) (0.397) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.002        
  (-0.324)        
ln(Pop active)  0.016       





  0.045*      
    (1.651)      
ln(Financial dev)    0.030**     
     (2.020)     
Capital open     0.003    
      (0.074)    
Democracy level      -0.050*   
       (-1.742)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.012 
        (0.300) 
N 2601 2598 2601 2160 2327 2476 2461 
N of countries 76 76 76 75 75 74 76 
Wald Chi² 4.212 6.818 6.276 9.805 7.525 4.642 7.842 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
  
Table 5.e: Mean-Group Common-correlated effects (CCEMG) estimates for the manufacturing VA share 
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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4.2.2. Robustness checks 
In this section, we provide some robustness checks for our main specification. 
We try to enter every dependent variable in diff-log form to be sure we are catching a within-country variation of 
our variables (Appendix 6). Then we test the inclusion of the lagged log version of our dependent variable among our 
determinants to assess the sensitivity to a dynamic specification (Appendix 7). Even though the lagged term is highly 
significant our CSCPI coefficients are still strongly significant even though the quantitative impact is slightly reduced. 
While promising, this specification suffers from the traditional endogeneity problem arising when a lagged 
dependent variable is included with the dependent variables because it becomes correlated with the residuals. One 
possibility would be to use a Difference or System-GMM estimator which is often used in those cases to tackle the 
endogeneity trouble but it can be problematic to find relevant instruments when the time dimension of our panel 
becomes relatively high and the cross-section dimension relatively low. Moreover, our empirical panel warrants the 
necessity to tackle the parameter heterogeneity as well as the cross-section dependence, which guards us from 
using it. An alternative could have been to use 5-year averages often used to get rid of cyclical variations, but our 
aim is exactly to assess the impact of short-run disturbances, namely commodity price variations so it cannot be a 
solution. Being aware of the endogeneity trouble in this regression, it seems useful as a sensitivity analysis to check 
the stability and significance of our coefficients. 
We then provide sensitivity to the country selection of our sample. We remove countries whose average population 
over our time period is below 1 million which removes 8 countries38 (Appendix 8). To stress the exogeneity of our 
CSCPI shocks, we remove from our sample current OPEC countries39 apart from Angola which joined in 2007, and 
add former member Gabon (Appendix 9). Our last robustness check consists in estimating our main specification 
using REER indices computed thanks to the WEO GDP deflator and the WEO CPI instead of the PWT 8.0 GDP deflator 
(Appendix 10). 
It appears that none of these estimations call into question our previous results regarding the impact of commodity 
price variations on our diversification indicators. Commodity price variations have induced an export concentration 
through the intensive margin that is to say through a decrease in the balance of already existing activities. However, 
estimates on the extensive margin, the relative quality index or the manufacturing share are weak to no significant. 
 
4.3. Analysis of commodity price booms and busts episodes 
While our econometric specifications have been illustrative of the role of commodity price variations in explaining 
diversification patterns, we may remind that our previous results have been computed on the whole sample. On top 
of that we have mostly focused on the contemporaneous impact of commodity price variations on diversification 
outcomes. However, these fluctuations could also impact the diversification pattern in the longer run as shown by 
the PMG estimates in section 4.1.   
Based on the commodity price booms and busts identified in section 3.3; we present in this section the evolution of 
our diversification indicators during these periods40. The point of this section is not to provide a true causal 
relationship from commodity price variations to trade diversification ruling out the evolution of other determinants 
over time. Instead, we have computed and tested the difference between the end and beginning of the period log 
forms of our diversification indices. 
It would have been better to compare years before the boom with years after the boom but our time sample limit 
this possibility because we miss numerous pre-boom observations for the 1970s commodity price booms as well as 
post-boom observations for the 2000s booms. As a results, assessing the evolution of our indicators between the 
beginning and the end of these episodes provide a relevant second-best option. 
38 Iceland, Guyana, Suriname, Bahrain, Qatar, Bhutan, Equatorial Guinea, Solomon Islands. 
39 These countries are Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Venezuela. 
40 Computations for boom episodes ending in 2011 have been computed until 2010 regarding the 3 indices of diversification and 
the relative quality index because of data unavailability. 
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We will also provide some analysis comparing the evolution of export diversification during 1970s and 2000s 
commodity price booms. 
Boom episodes Bust episodes 
Variable Diff. P-Value N Variable Diff. P-Value N 
ln(conc index) 0.093*** 0.000 85 ln(conc index) -0.121*** 0.000 62 
ln(int margin) 0.138*** 0.000 85 ln(int margin) -0.056* 0.057 62 
ln(ext margin) -0.208** 0.028 81 ln(ext margin) -0.402*** 0.001 60 
ln(quality index) -0.041* 0.059 78 ln(quality index) -0.039 0.160 55 
ln(manu share) -0.147*** 0.001 87 ln(manu share) 0.034 0.640 67 
ln(CSCPI) 1.377*** 0.000 94 ln(CSCPI) -1.201*** 0.000 77 
ln(REER) 0.348*** 0.000 88 ln(REER) -0.329*** 0.000 67 
ln(GFCF share) 0.088* 0.056 87 ln(GFCF share) 0.056 0.457 67 
ln(school) 0.297*** 0.000 72 ln(school) 0.506*** 0.000 61 
vol(CSCPI) 2.194*** 0.000 94 vol(CSCPI) -0.315 0.244 77 
ln(pop active) 0.121*** 0.000 94 ln(pop active) 0.265*** 0.000 77 
ln(M/GDP) 0.023 0.597 87 ln(M/GDP) 0.212*** 0.002 67 
ln(financial dev) 1.149*** 0.000 66 ln(financial dev) -0.550** 0.016 45 
capital open 0.037 0.115 78 capital open 0.098** 0.018 57 
democracy 0.045** 0.047 80 democracy 0.139*** 0.000 62 
ln(GDP PPP pc) 0.550*** 0.000 84 ln(GDP PPP pc) 0.558*** 0.000 61 
 
4.3.1. Commodity price booms 
First, we depict the evolution of diversification outcomes between the end and the beginning of the selected boom 
episodes. In line with our previous results, graph 2.a. and 2.b. confirm that commodity price booms have increased 
export concentration during most episodes (62/85) especially through an increase in the intensive margin index 
(64/85). While the pattern regarding the extensive margin component in graph 2.c. seems to lean towards a 
decrease over time, it is dominated by few episodes of strong decrease but is mixed when having a deeper look with 
mostly as many episodes linked to a decrease (46/81) or an increase of the extensive margin component41. The 
pattern is also mixed regarding the relative quality index in graph 2.d. with only a slight majority of commodity price 
boom episodes related to a decrease in the exported goods quality (43/78). In accordance to the Dutch disease 
literature, almost two third (56/87) of the boom episodes represented in graph 2.e. have shrunk the size of the 
manufacturing sector.  
To complement this first analysis, we have provided in table 6 the results for testing the non-significance of the 
difference between the end and beginning of the period for each output. The results show a highly significant 9.3% 
increase of export concentration especially through the intensive margin during booms as well as a highly significant 
14.7% decrease of the manufacturing value added share. While the 20.6% decrease of the extensive margin 
component could seem substantial the dominance of outliers in the pattern evidenced previously prevent us from 
emphasizing this result so much. Finally, the relative quality index slightly decreased but this result is only significant 
at the 10% margin. 
Those results are especially concerning because it evidences the failure from both governments having faced 
commodity price booms as well as from the private sector as a whole to trigger export diversification. At best the 
relative quality of their exported goods have not improved despite the commodity windfall and the manufacturing 
sector has decreased in size certainly through the traditional Dutch disease mechanism. While these concerns may 
not have been so problematic during those boom episodes they may have penalized the economy during the 
subsequent commodity price reversal.   
41 This illustrates the need to weight for outliers we have tackled in our main CCEMG specifications. 
Table 6: Test for the non-significance of the difference between the end and beginning of the period outputs 
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 Graph 2.a: Evolution of the concentration index during commodity price booms 
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 Graph 2.b: Evolution of the intensive margin index during commodity price booms 
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 Graph 2.c: Evolution of the extensive margin index during commodity price booms 
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 Graph 2.d: Evolution of the relative quality index during commodity price booms 
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 Graph 2.e: Evolution of the manufacturing VA share during commodity price booms 
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4.3.2. Comparison between the commodity price booms of the 1970s and the 2000s 
 
Unlike our commodity bust episodes, almost half of our commodity price boom episodes occurred during the 1970s 
and the remaining half during the 2000s which represent two periods of overall commodity price booms. We benefit 
from this looking at the evolution of the diversification pattern during each boom in table 7. 
Surprisingly the export concentration index has only significantly increased for episodes in the 2000s with a 14% 
increase against a non-significant 3.2% increase in the 1970s, while the result remains significant in both cases 
regarding the intensive margin index. In fact, we may have expected a sounder macroeconomic management during 
the most recent year as well as a greater care for the diversification agenda in resource-dependent countries. It is 
tempting to draw a parallel with the current difficulty of countries like Venezuela to recover despite having failed to 
diversify when the money was coming. Some external factors could also explain this pattern: the more competitive 
trade environment in the 2000s than in the 1970s, the openness and currency undervaluation of East Asian 
economies including China in the 2000s, or the decrease in trade barriers over time which may have complicated the 
arrival of newcomers42.  
We find a similar result as before concerning the extensive margin index evolution during the 1970s with a strong 
but only partly significant decrease dominated by some outliers while the decrease has been weaker and no 
significant for episodes in the 2000s. This result goes in the same direction giving some indication of fewer new 
exported products during the 2000s than in the 1970s.  
Regarding the decrease in the relative quality index it has only been significant for episodes in the 1970s. Even 
though the quality did not improve during the last boom, the decrease of the relative quality did not occur like in the 
1970s. However, the fact that the manufacturing sector size was significantly reduced (and more strongly) during the 
2000s and not in the 1970s is also worrying for the current low commodity price era those countries are facing. 
While some may point out that the mean commodity price boom has been 16.5 percentage point higher for the 
1970s episodes it doesn’t represent a so big difference in comparison with the respective 146.5% and 130% mean 
commodity price increases. On top of that with 30 more years of experiences in economics management such a 
difference in commodity price shock can be hardly seen or even shouldn’t explain the weaker performance in the 
2000s regarding the diversification and structural transformation indicators. 
Despite the small size of our sample and as a result the poor quality of our statistical tests we provide in table 8 the 
results of the non-significance test of the difference between the evolution of one indicator in the 2000s and the 
evolution of the same indicator in the 1970s restricting our sample to countries having faced both booms. The 
results fail to provide any significant difference for the evolution of our diversification indicators during both booms 
even though we find a stronger increase of the overall concentration index at the 10% margin. 
If we can see some signs of a less pessimistic pattern for the 2000s episodes than previously we should not forget 
the decrease in the quality of the test due to the decrease in the sample size. Moreover, restricting our sample to 
countries having already faced a comparable boom episode in the 1970s we could have expected a better 
diversification performance during the 2000s which apparently at best has not been the case   
42 I leave the identification of the right explanation to further research. 
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Booms 1970s Booms 2000s 
Variable Diff. P-Value N Variable Diff. P-Value N 
ln(conc index) 0.032 0.207 37 ln(conc index) 0.140*** 0.000 48 
ln(int margin) 0.102*** 0.004 37 ln(int margin) 0.166*** 0.000 48 
ln(ext margin) -0.311* 0.059 37 ln(ext margin) -0.122 0.260 44 
ln(quality index) -0.101** 0.020 30 ln(quality index) -0.004 0.861 48 
ln(manu share) -0.114 0.110 38 ln(manu share) -0.174*** 0.002 49 
ln(CSCPI) 1.465*** 0.000 44 ln(CSCPI) 1.300*** 0.000 50 
ln(REER) 0.349*** 0.000 38 ln(REER) 0.348*** 0.000 50 
ln(GFCF share) 0.085 0.140 38 ln(GFCF share) 0.090 0.193 49 
ln(school) 0.353*** 0.000 34 ln(school) 0.246*** 0.000 38 
vol(CSCPI) 2.267*** 0.000 44 vol(CSCPI) 2.130*** 0.000 50 
ln(pop active) 0.206*** 0.000 44 ln(pop active) 0.046* 0.080 50 
ln(M/GDP) 0.075 0.243 38 ln(M/GDP) -0.018 0.758 49 
ln(financial dev) 0.950*** 0.000 24 ln(financial dev) 1.262*** 0.000 42 
capital open 0.047 0.119 31 capital open 0.030 0.372 47 
democracy 0.056 0.204 32 democracy 0.038 0.121 48 
ln(GDP PPP pc) 0.568*** 0.000 35 ln(GDP PPP pc) 0.537*** 0.000 49 
 
 
Booms 2000s - Booms 1970s 
Variable Diff 2000s Diff 1970s Diff 2000s-Diff 1970s P-Value N 
ln(conc index) 0.129 0.038 0.091** 0.041 31 
ln(int margin) 0.162 0.112 0.049 0.337 31 
ln(ext margin) -0.195 -0.323 0.128 0.559 29 
ln(quality index) -0.012 -0.112 0.099 0.182 25 
ln(manu share) -0.191 -0.116 -0.075 0.464 31 
ln(CSCPI) 1.384 1.571 -0.187*** 0.000 38 
ln(REER) 0.409 0.422 -0.013 0.911 32 
ln(GFCF share) 0.047 0.065 -0.018 0.858 31 
ln(school) 0.258 0.337 -0.079 0.322 22 
vol(CSCPI) 2.332 1.669 0.663 0.155 38 
ln(pop active) 0.046 0.226 -0.180*** 0.000 38 
ln(M/GDP) -0.049 0.050 -0.099 0.217 31 
ln(financial dev) 0.634 1.115 -0.481** 0.021 17 
capital open 0.004 0.030 -0.026 0.693 23 
democracy 0.004 0.092 -0.088 0.162 25 




Table 7: Test for the non-significance of the difference between the end and beginning of the period 
outputs during each commodity price boom 
Table 8: Test for the non-significance of the difference between each boom output evolution for countries 
having experienced 2 major commodity price booms 
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 4.3.3. Commodity price busts 
 
We now turn our attention to the evolution of our diversification outcomes during bust episodes. Graph 3.a. and 3.b. 
evidence a decrease of the concentration index for nearly three quarters of our episodes (47/62) especially through 
a decrease of the intensive margin index (46/62). It confirms the previously uncovered result of an increase in export 
diversification during commodity price drops. More interesting, the pattern also holds for the extensive margin 
component in graph 3.c. so that almost three quarters of our busts episodes have seen a decrease of the extensive 
margin index (44/60). While the pattern is less striking, a majority of commodity price busts episodes has induced a 
decrease of the relative quality index (34/55) in graph 3.d. The pattern is mixed for the manufacturing value added 
share with only a slight majority of our bust episodes in graph 3.e. having been followed by a decrease in the 
manufacturing sector size (38/67). 
Like for the commodity price booms analysis, we have performed some tests for the non-significance of the 
difference between our end of the period and beginning of the period outcomes in table 6. The results confirm the 
graphical pattern with a highly significant 12.1% decrease of our concentration index during commodity price busts. 
Even though the intensive margin index decreases, its magnitude is weak and is only significant at the 10% level. 
However, the extensive margin index has strongly and significantly decreased from 40.2% which is both a stronger 
and more significant result than the one obtained for commodity price booms. Even though the number of recorded 
exported products may have increased over time due to reasons unrelated to the diversification, it illustrates a 
higher direction toward export diversification during commodity price drops than during commodity price booms. 
Besides, both the relative quality index and the manufacturing share have not significantly evolved during these bust 
episodes. 
These results confirm the increase in export diversification during commodity price busts which put in perspective 
with the increase in export concentration during commodity price booms gives us a pattern consistent with what we 
observed in graph 1.a. It also provides an explanation for the positive and significant impact of commodity price 
variations on export concentration evidenced previously. While the relative quality of exported products has not 
significantly been impacted by commodity price busts, the manufacturing sector doesn’t significantly increase in 
relative size despite the decrease in value of the natural resource value added following the commodity price 
decrease. Whether countries managed to diversify their economy both through a rebalancing of already exported 
goods and through the arrival of new exported products, it has not significantly increased the relative manufacturing 
value added share. It could either be illustrative of new activities with a small value added importance in the 
economy or of the development of non-manufacturing goods exports (mostly commodities), even though the former 
option is more likely. 
 
Études et documents n° 15, CERDI, 2016
36
 Graph 3.a: Evolution of the concentration index during commodity price busts 
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 Graph 3.b: Evolution of the intensive margin index during commodity price busts 
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 Graph 3.c: Evolution of the extensive margin index during commodity price busts 
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 Graph 3.d: Evolution of the relative quality index during commodity price busts 
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 Graph 3.e: Evolution of the manufacturing VA share during commodity price busts 




While resource-dependent countries currently face an overall commodity price bust, diversifying their economy 
turned out to be one of the preoccupations at the top of their policy agenda as soon as the commodity prices 
reversed.  
In order to increase our knowledge on the relationship between commodity price booms or busts and the pattern of 
diversification, this paper has analyzed the impact of commodity price variations on diversification outcomes thanks 
to a panel of 78 countries over 1970-2012 using successively a cointegration methodology, a dynamic macro-panel 
model, as well as a discussion analyzing previously selected commodity price boom and bust episodes and the 
evolution of diversification patterns over these periods. 
We have found a strong empirical evidence of a significant impact of commodity price increases on export 
concentration especially through a more concentrated mix of already exported products (intensive margin), which is 
robust to model specification, sample changes, as well as alternative control variables. However, we find weak to no 
evidence of the impact of commodity price variations on the extensive margin of export concentration, the relative 
quality of exported goods, or the evolution of the manufacturing value added share. 
Going deeper into this relationship, we have evidenced that this positive relationship may arise through an increase 
of export concentration during commodity price booms and an increase of export diversification during commodity 
price busts. Based on a comparison between commodity booms in the 1970s and the 2000s, we have found some 
indications of a stronger increase of export concentration during the 2000s commodity price boom which may have 
increased the recent difficulties for highly resource-dependent countries to recover their economy in the context of 
current low commodity prices.  
These results reveal a potential lack of interest from governments to support export diversification when commodity 
prices are booming. However, commodity prices rarely stay high forever and countries may have only started to 
implement reforms and investments to diversify when the price reversal left them with a very concentrated and 
natural resource dependent export basket. While commodity price booms can be an opportunity to diversify most 
countries did not seize it and may have waited the commodity price fall in order to put more emphasis on the 
diversification agenda. 
Resource-dependent countries should put more focus on diversifying their economy as well as investing in key 
determinants while commodity prices are booming in order to prepare the economy for the following commodity 
price drop. Because some reforms such as easing in business creation or foreign direct investment legal conditions, 
as well as investments like transportation networks or human capital may impact economic diversification in the 
longer-run, officials should not wait too long before implementing these measures.  
While we have been able to compare the diversification evolution between the 1970s and 2000s commodity price 
booms, it would be interesting to implement a same comparison between the 1980s-1990s commodity price drops 
and the recent period of commodity price fall. This empirical study would also gain from some analysis on the 
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Appendix 1: Geographical representation of resource-dependence for 2003-2007 
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Appendix 2: Aggregation of commodity exports 
We compute natural resources exports merging data from UNCTAD for the period 1995-2012 and from COMTRADE 
when available before 1995.  
One traditional drawback of these data is the problem of 0 values which are difficult to identify between a false or a 
true 0. While establishing a model to tackle this bias is beyond the scope of this paper, we benefit from UNCTAD 
data which complement COMTRADE data with estimates for missing values. As a result, this enables us to increase 
significantly our country coverage as well as to bypass this bias. 
As it is standard in the literature we define exports by commodity groups defined according to the 3rd revision of the 
SITC such as: 
-Agricultural raw materials=2-22-27-28 
-Food=0+1+4+22 
-Fuels=3 
-Ores and metals=27+28+667+68+971 
 
Appendix 3: Trade and price matching 
Our first source of price data is the IFS who provides monthly commodity price series. When we decided to introduce 
other categories or to complement missing data we used data from UNCTAD. Every nominal commodity price index 
has been deflated by the US consumer price index and then deseasonalized thanks to the X12-ARIMA procedure of 
the Census Bureau. 
As noticed by Medina (2010), the matching between trade data from the standard SITC and commodity price indices 
necessitate making some assumptions.  First SITC categories (3rd revision) which are the closest possible from the 
definition of the commodity price series are matched to get exports data by commodity going up to a 5-digit 
categories level of accuracy in the SITC classification. 
As stated above the importance of missing data in the COMTRADE database, motivated the use of UNCTAD data. 
However, the UNCTAD database provides estimates for missing data only at the 3-digit categories level. At this point 
we had to make additional assumptions.  
Over the period 2003-2007, a coefficient catching the relative importance of the different commodities at the 4 or 5-
digit level in each 3-digit category has been computed when the resources could have been identified with 
COMTRADE data and when they represent together a significant share of the 3-digit category aggregate. Because of 
missing data, this coefficient is identical for every country in the database and represents the global mean 
importance of these product categories which gives us a figure the least biased by missing data as possible. 
In the tables below, the figures between brackets correspond to the number of commodities which are represented 
in the corresponding 3-digit category. For instance, the exports value from category 057 “Fruit and nuts (not 
including oil nuts), fresh or dried” has been split in constant shares between orange exports and bananas exports 
depending on the mean relative importance of sub-categories 0571 “Oranges, mandarins, clementines and similar 
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Food products 
Commodity Mean weight UNCTAD 3-digit SITC code (rev 3) COMTRADE up to 5-digit SITC code (rev 3) 
Data 
source 
Bananas 2.57 057(2) 0573 UNCTAD 
Beef 1.48 001(4), 011, 016(2), 017(3) 0011, 011, 01251, 01252, 01681, 0176 IMF 
Cocoa 1.90 072, 073 072, 073 UNCTAD 
Coconut oil 0.35 422(4) 4223 IMF 
Coffee 3.13 071 071 IMF1 
Copra 0.26 081(10), 223(3) 08137, 2231 IMF 
Cottonseed oil 0.09 081(10), 222(4), 421(4) 08133, 2223, 4212 UNCTAD 
Fish 3.43 034, 035, 037(2) 034, 035, 0371 IMF2 
Fish meal 0.20 081(10) 08142 IMF 
Groundnuts 0.12 081(10), 222(4) 08132, 2221 IMF 
Groundnuts oil 0.26 421(4) 4213 IMF 
Lamb 0.08 001(4), 012(3) 0012, 0121, 01255, 01256 IMF 
Linseed oil 0.02 223(3), 422(4) 2234, 4221 IMF 
Maize 0.28 044, 047, 081(10) 044, 04711, 04721, 05461, 08124 IMF 
Orange 0.80 057(2), 059 0571, 0591 IMF2 
Palm kernel oil 0.02 422(4) 4224 IMF 
Palm oil 0.32 223(3), 422(4) 2232, 4222 IMF 
Pepper 0.24 075 0751 UNCTAD 
Rice 0.52 042, 081(10) 042, 08125 IMF 
Shrimp 1.44 036, 037(2) 036, 0372 IMF 
Soybean 0.50 222(4) 2222 IMF 
Soybean meal 0.36 081(10), 098 08131, 09841 IMF 
Soybean oil 0.14 421(4) 4211 IMF 
Sugar 1.45 061, 062, 081(10) 05487, 05488, 06, 0815 IMF1 
Sunflower oil 0.24 081(10), 222(4) 08135, 2224 IMF 
Tea 0.82 074 074 IMF 
Tobacco 1.77 121 121 IMF 
Wheat 0.72 041, 046, 048, 081(10) 041, 046, 048, 08126 IMF 
Agricultural raw materials 
Commodity Mean weight UNCTAD 3-digit SITC code (rev 3) COMTRADE up to 5-digit SITC code (rev 3) 
Data 
source 
Cotton 4.65 263 263 UNCTAD1 
Hides 0.27 211, 212 211, 212 IMF 
Rubber 0.36 231 23 IMF1 
Timber 3.53 245, 246, 247, 248 24 IMF1 
Wood pulp 0.25 251 251 IMF 
Wool 0.39 268 268 IMF 
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 Ores and metals 
Commodity Mean weight UNCTAD 3-digit SITC code (rev 3) COMTRADE up to 5-digit SITC code (rev 3) Data source 
Aluminum 5.24 285, 288(6), 684 285, 28823, 684 IMF 
Copper 5.40 283, 288(6), 682 283, 28821, 682 IMF 
Diamonds 4.36 667 667 
IMF, 
Bloomberg3 
Gold 4.49 971 971 IMF 
Iron ore 1.49 281, 282 281, 282 IMF 
Lead 0.18 287(3), 288(6), 685 2874, 28824, 685 IMF 
Manganese ore 0.27 287(5) 2877 UNCTAD 
Nickel 0.67 284, 288(6), 683 284, 28822, 683 IMF 
Phosphate 0.17 272(2) 2723 IMF 
Potash 0.09 272(2) 2724 IMF 
Silver 0.44 289, 681 28911, 6811 IMF 
Tin 0.38 287(5), 288(6), 687 2876, 28826, 687 IMF 
Tungsten ore 0.07 287(5) 28792, 68911 UNCTAD 
Uranium 0.66 286 2861 IMF 
Zinc 0.83 287(5), 288(6), 686 2875, 28825, 686 IMF 
Fuels 
Commodity Mean weight UNCTAD 3-digit SITC code (rev 3) COMTRADE up to 5-digit SITC code (rev 3) Data source 
Coal 1.02 321, 322, 325 32 IMF2 
Crude oil 27.80 333 333 IMF1 
Gasoline  7.31 334, 335 334, 335 IMF2 









Mean weight: Average time-invariant and country-specific weights over the whole sample.  
3-digit (UNCTAD): Product codes following the SITC revision 3 classification. 
Up to 5 digits (COMTRADE): Product codes following the SITC revision 3 classification. 
In parenthesis, the number of commodity groups to which the 3-digit line refers (e.g. the line 037 includes both fish and shrimp). To 
disentangle the export value for each commodity group I compute the relative share of each commodity over the sample computed thanks 
to the average weights over the whole sample previously obtained thanks to the 5-digits COMTRADE data (e.g. fish will get 8.04/(8.04 
+3.82) times the value of line 037).   
1: Simple average of the available prices. 
2: Computation of missing values thanks to the rate of growth of the closest commodity price available (crude oil price for coal, uranium, 
gasoline and natural gas; bananas price for oranges; and fish meal price for fish). 
3: Diamond prices are only available on a daily basis over 2002-2012. Since this commodity group is the 6th most important in our basket, 
we didn’t remove it and used the metal price index (weighted average of copper, aluminum, iron ore, tin, nickel, zinc, and lead prices) from 
the IMF instead of diamonds prices for previous variations. 
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Appendix 4: Commodity specialization patterns of resource-dependent countries 
 
Low income countries 
 
Country 
% total exports 
Main commodities in the CSCPI with corresponding weights computed over 2003-2007 
Raw agri Food Mining Energy Commodities 
Benin (BEN) 48.7 22.0 7.9 17.0 94.3 Cotton 49.2, Gasoline 17.4, Bananas 7.7 
Chad (TCD) 17.3 0.1 0.1 73.8 91.3 Crude oil 75, Cotton 16.5, Gasoline 7.9 
Guinea-Bissau (GNB) 1.1 75.3 0.5 7.0 84.0 Bananas 66.3, Orange 16.3, Crude oil 11.7 
Tajikistan (TJK) 16.9 7.5 70.5 7.4 83.4 Aluminum 72.9, Cotton 19 
Mauritania (MRT) 0.2 34.7 39.9 7.6 82.5 Iron ore 43.8, Fish 20.7, Crude oil 10.5, Copper 5.9 
Burkina Faso (BFA) 63.0 15.9 1.8 0.2 81.0 Cotton 81.8 
Dem. Rep. of Congo (COD) 5.7 2.1 62.3 10.8 80.9 Diamonds 44.7, Crude oil 13.4, Copper 9.8, Zinc 8.2, Timber 7.9 
Guinea (GIN) 2.0 6.8 58.3 12.4 79.4 Aluminum 56.6, Crude oil 13.7, Copper 6.9 
Mozambique (MOZ) 3.7 17.1 46.3 11.7 78.8 Aluminum 61.2, Tobacco 9.1, Shrimp 5.1 
Mali (MLI) 38.1 4.4 30.8 0.4 73.6 Cotton 51.3, Gold 42 
Zimbabwe (ZWE) 11.3 26.9 30.3 5.1 73.5 Nickel 34.1, Tobacco 25.3, Cotton 10.5, Coal 7.9, Gold 5.4 
Central Afr. Rep. (CAF) 35.4 2.4 33.9 0.9 72.6 Timber 42, Diamonds 38.8, Cotton 12.1 
Myanmar (MMR) 17.6 17.2 3.7 28.0 66.5 Natural gas 46.5, Timber 28.5, Shrimp 6.9 
Burundi (BDI) 2.2 34.7 20.4 0.5 57.7 Coffee 51.5, Gold 30.9, Tea 5.2 
Uganda (UGA) 7.6 40.5 5.7 0.9 54.6 Coffee 29.2, Fish 23.5, Tobacco 8.9, Gold 8.9, Cotton 6.8, Tea 5.6 
Tanzania (TZA) 5.5 22.6 19.0 2.1 49.2 Gold 22.7, Fish 12.5, Tobacco 8.3, Silver 7.2, Copper 6.7, Coffee 6.7, Cotton 6 
Niger (NER) 2.2 17.0 20.3 7.1 46.6 Uranium 42.9, Beef 18.3, Gasoline 14.7, Crude oil 7.6, Gold 5.5 
Togo (TGO) 9.5 16.6 9.2 11.0 46.3 Gasoline 24.6, Cotton 19.6, Cocoa 13.3, Phosphate 11.2, Potash 5.9 
Sierra Leone (SLE) 0.9 13.9 29.6 1.1 45.3 Diamonds 49.1, Coffee 21.5, Cocoa 6.8, Aluminum 6.1 
Kenya (KEN) 8.3 25.6 2.2 7.1 43.2 Tea 37.7, Gasoline 25.7, Coffee 9.5, Fish 5.8 
Kyrgyzstan (KGZ) 5.7 8.9 19.3 9.1 43.0 Gold 38.2, Gasoline 18.1, Cotton 11.3, Iron ore 7.2 
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Lower middle income countries 
 
Country 
% total exports 
Main commodities in the CSCPI with corresponding weights computed over 2003-2007 
Raw agri Food Mining Energy Commodities 
Iraq (IRQ) 0.1 0.6 0.4 98.0 98.4 Crude oil 97.7 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) 9.3 18.9 41.4 23.7 93.3 Crude oil 22.8, Copper 20.7, Gold 20.4, Timber 9.6 
Nigeria (NGA) 0.3 1.4 0.3 89.9 92.0 Crude oil 89.8, Natural gas 5.9 
Rep. of Congo (COG) 5.8 0.9 5.9 79.2 91.9 Crude oil 81, Timber 6.1 
Sudan (SDN) 3.4 6.7 2.7 74.0 86.9 Crude oil 55, Gasoline 32.9 
Malawi (MWI) 3.6 79.8 0.3 0.2 83.9 Tobacco 66.7, Sugar 12, Tea 8.4 
Yemen (YEM) 0.3 4.5 1.6 74.8 81.3 Crude oil 85, Gasoline 7.7 
Bolivia (BOL) 1.8 17.8 17.3 41.8 78.7 Natural gas 44.1, Crude oil 9.5, Tin 7.3 
Zambia (ZMB) 4.0 9.3 58.0 0.9 72.2 Copper 77.9 
Solomon Islands (SLB) 52.3 18.5 0.3 0.3 71.4 Timber 72.6, Fish 15.2 
Guyana (GUY) 5.1 33.4 28.3 0.0 66.8 Sugar 25.1, Gold 22, Aluminum 11.7, Rice 10.2, Diamonds 8.4, Timber 7.7, Shrimp 6.9 
Cote d'Ivoire (CIV) 7.5 36.8 0.5 21.7 66.4 Cocoa 41.7, Gasoline 21.6, Crude oil 11.7 
Ghana (GHA) 5.5 43.1 11.3 4.2 64.1 Cocoa 54, Tea 7.3, Gold 5.9 
Cameroon (CMR) 12.9 12.3 2.9 35.1 63.2 Crude oil 49, Timber 14.5, Cocoa 8.7, Gasoline 7.5, Bananas 5.4 
Syria (SYR) 2.2 15.1 1.3 43.1 61.6 Crude oil 64.8, Gasoline 14.3 
Mongolia (MNG) 5.6 1.5 49.1 3.2 59.4 Copper 50.8, Gold 22.3, Wool 8.6 
Uzbekistan (UZB) 22.8 9.0 13.3 11.9 57.1 Cotton 41.6, Natural gas 19.1, Copper 11.8, Bananas 7, Gold 6.9 
Indonesia (IDN) 4.8 10.7 7.6 23.0 46.1 Natural gas 20, Crude oil 17.1, Copper 10, Coal 9.5, Rubber 6.7, Coconut oil 6, Palm oil 5.4, Gasoline 5.3 
Bhutan (BTN) 0.5 13.3 12.8 19.0 45.6 Copper 47, Bananas 10.4, Coconut oil 9.1, Palm oil 8.1 
Armenia (ARM) 1.1 8.6 32.9 1.3 43.9 Diamonds 52.8, Copper 21.2, Aluminum 6 
Vietnam (VNM) 2.8 18.0 0.7 20.2 41.7 Crude oil 45, Shrimp 13, Rice 7.9, Fish 6.7, Coffee 6.4, Rubber 5.1 
Guatemala (GTM) 2.9 31.3 1.6 4.7 40.5 Coffee 21.7, Bananas 17.1, Sugar 16.1, Crude oil 10.3, Oranges 5 
Senegal (SEN) 1.7 22.2 3.1 13.5 40.5 Gasoline 34.1, Fish 22.4, Shrimp 16.4, Crude oil 5.7 
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Upper middle income countries 
Country 
% total exports 
Main commodities in the CSCPI with corresponding weights computed over 2003-2007 
Raw agri Food Mining Energy Commodities 
Angola (AFG) 0.0 0.1 2.2 94.1 96.4 Crude oil 95.7 
Algeria (DZA) 0.0 0.2 0.5 92.9 93.6 Crude oil 53.8, Natural gas 36.4, Gasoline 9.1 
Libya (LBY) 0.0 0.1 0.6 88.3 89.0 Crude oil 86.9, Gasoline 9.8 
Gabon (GAB) 10.8 0.7 5.3 69.1 85.9 Crude oil 79.1, Timber 12.4 
Turkmenistan (TKM) 2.5 0.1 0.6 81.9 85.1 Natural gas 78.2, Gasoline 14.5 
Venezuela (VEN) 0.1 1.0 4.5 77.2 82.8 Crude oil 76, Gasoline 16.6 
Azerbaijan (AZE) 1.1 4.0 2.7 75.0 82.7 Crude oil 73.5, Gasoline 18.4 
Iran (IRN) 0.4 2.5 2.2 75.1 80.1 Crude oil 89.7 
Ecuador (ECU) 3.9 26.4 0.6 47.7 78.6 Crude oil 59.2, Bananas 12.1, Shrimp 7.1, Gasoline 5.6, Fish 5 
Kazakhstan (KAZ) 0.8 3.5 14.2 59.6 78.0 Crude oil 69.3, Copper 7.6 
Botswana (BWA) 0.1 2.0 73.2 0.1 75.5 Diamonds 81.2, Copper 8.3, Nickel 7.2 
Peru (PER) 1.4 14.7 52.1 6.8 75.0 Copper 27.2, Gold 22.6, Zinc 7.8, Gasoline 7.1, Tin 5.2 
Suriname (SUR) 0.5 11.4 58.5 3.7 74.0 Aluminum 53.9, Gold 26.6, Gasoline 5 
Chile (CHL) 5.8 16.9 48.7 2.0 73.3 Copper 62.4, Fish 7, Bananas 6 
Russia (RUS) 2.6 1.6 7.2 52.8 64.1 Crude oil 44, Natural gas 18.6, Gasoline 18.3 
Namibia (NAM) 0.6 24.4 36.5 1.0 62.5 Diamonds 33.2, Fish 25.4, Zinc 15.2, Uranium 6.8, Copper 5.7, Beef 5.3 
Argentina (ARG) 1.2 40.8 3.7 13.0 58.7 Gasoline 10.9, Crude oil 9.7, Wheat 8.4, Soybean meal 7.5, Maize 6.3, Soybean 5.2, Natural gas 5.1 
Colombia (COL) 4.0 14.2 4.7 32.3 55.1 Crude oil 32.3, Coal 20.1, Gasoline 11.9, Coffee 11.8, Gold 5.9 
Uruguay (URY) 6.9 36.8 1.3 2.5 47.5 Beef 36.7, Rice 11.5, Wool 8.5, Timber 7.1, Fish 6.5, Gasoline 5.8 
Brazil (BRA) 3.5 23.4 9.4 5.6 41.9 Iron ore 14.1, Crude oil 9.5, Sugar 8.8, Aluminum 6.3, Soybean 6.3, Gasoline 5.9, Coffee 5.6, Beef 5 
 
High income countries 
Country 
% total exports 
Main commodities in the CSCPI with corresponding weights computed over 2003-2007 
Raw agri Food Mining Energy Commodities 
Equatorial Guinea (GNQ) 2.1 0.1 0.0 90.7 92.9 Crude oil 94.1 
Saudi Arabia (SAU) 0.1 0.8 0.6 81.9 83.4 Crude oil 85.1, Gasoline 9.6 
Oman (OMN) 0.0 2.6 0.9 79.8 83.3 Crude oil 78.6, Natural gas 16.9 
Brunei (BRN) 0.0 0.1 0.4 82.4 83.0 Crude oil 62.9, Natural gas 36.2 
Kuwait (KWT) 0.1 0.3 0.7 78.1 79.2 Crude oil 68.3, Gasoline 26.2 
Qatar (QAT) 0.0 0.1 0.3 76.8 77.2 Crude oil 59.4, Natural gas 34.6, Gasoline 5.6 
United Arab Emirates (ARE) 0.2 2.9 9.6 60.2 72.9 Crude oil 65.6, Gasoline 11.7, Natural gas 6.9 
Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) 0.0 2.7 1.0 59.9 63.6 Natural gas 46.9, Gasoline 32.1, Crude oil 17.3 
Norway (NOR) 0.4 4.1 5.4 50.1 60.1 Crude oil 56, Natural gas 22.9, Fish 6, Aluminum 5.5, Gasoline 5.4 
Bahrain (BHR) 0.0 1.2 26.8 29.4 57.4 Gasoline 48.3, Aluminum 36.5, Iron ore 6.5 
Australia (AUS) 3.1 12.5 22.2 17.2 55.0 Coal 19.9, Iron ore 11.7, Aluminum 11.1, Gold 8.3, Crude oil 6.9, Beef 5.9, Copper 5.4, Natural gas 5.1 
Iceland (ISL) 0.5 35.8 13.9 0.8 51.0 Fish 60.2, Aluminum 27.4 
New Zealand (NZL) 7.6 34.7 3.7 1.9 47.8 Beef 18.3, Timber 14.1, Aluminum 10.6, Bananas 9.2, Fish 7.3, Wool 6.9, Crude oil 5.5, Wood pulp 5.3 
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Appendix 5: REER computation 
 
In order to maximize our country and time coverage, we compute our own REER series for each countries using a 
unified procedure based on UNCTAD trade data.  
First, we have computed yearly trade weights using a methodology close to Bayoumi et al (2006) even though we 
distinguish 5 categories of traded goods. 
Goods SITC rev 3 classification 
Food 0+1+22+4 
Raw agricultural materials 2-22-27-28 




This weighting scheme takes into account potential 3rd market effects in the manufacturing sector, assign 
manufacturing weights for service trade, and compute separately weights for the 4 other categories of commodities. 
While fuels and minerals are often excluded from the trade figures used to compute these weights, it seems 
problematic when we focus entirely in resource-dependent countries whose commodity exports dominate their 
trade pattern. As a result, we didn’t remove those flow because we feel it can proxy potential trade networks 
between two countries which could be activated one day or the other in order to trade non-commodity goods, and 
we would lose some information removing those. 
The final weight is a weighting average of the 5 category weights and has been computed for each economy-partner 
pair for each year over 1995-2011. We use the median weight obtained normalized so that each year-specific sum of 
these new weights sum up to 1.  
Even though it is standard in the literature to use the CPI when one what to maximize its country and time coverage, 
we prefer GDP deflators as our proxies of domestic price factors. In fact, while it seems important to take into 
account the trending importance of the global value chain, it is difficult to use value added based trade weights. 
However, it has motivated our choice of GDP deflator as our preferred proxy in order to catch the price linked to 
produced value added. 
We use GDP deflators from the PWT 8.0 because it maximizes our coverage so that our REER is available for 188 over 
1990-2011 and for 161 countries over 1970-1989. As robustness checks, we have also computed REER based on the 
GDP deflator from the WEO and a REER based on the CPI from the WEO.  
The complete description for the computation of the trade weights and the final indices may be published in a future 
draft.   
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 Appendix 6: CCEMG estimations with variables in diff-log form 
 
Specifications using the concentration index 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Conc index) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.114*** 0.140*** 0.112*** 0.137*** 0.116*** 
  (3.861) (5.203) (6.085) (3.524) (4.692) (6.316) (5.006) 
∆ln(REER) 0.052** 0.034 0.010 0.047* 0.023 0.032* 0.017 
  (2.379) (1.631) (0.407) (1.903) (1.069) (1.705) (0.776) 
∆ln(GFCFshare) -0.017 -0.003 -0.048*** -0.014 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 
  (-1.259) (-0.343) (-2.870) (-0.861) (-0.354) (-0.064) (-0.662) 
∆ln(School) -0.060* -0.003 -0.045 -0.039 -0.054 -0.024 -0.044 
  (-1.948) (-0.084) (-1.470) (-1.034) (-1.503) (-0.792) (-1.269) 
∆vol(CSCPI) -0.001        
  (-0.235)        
∆ln(Pop active)  -0.666       





  0.005      
    (0.258)      
∆ln(Financial dev)    -0.006     
     (-0.352)     
∆Capital open     0.013    
      (0.396)    
∆Democracy level      -0.009   
       (-0.418)   
∆ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.058 
        (1.303) 
N 1662 1659 1662 1360 1496 1604 1577 
N of countries 67 67 67 60 65 66 65 
Wald Chi² 26.002 32.398 47.652 17.976 25.695 43.612 29.411 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Specifications using the intensive margin index 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Int margin) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.073** 0.117*** 0.091*** 0.131*** 0.086*** 0.141*** 0.098*** 
  (2.247) (4.453) (3.690) (3.229) (3.321) (4.719) (3.691) 
∆ln(REER) 0.030 0.032 0.030 0.018 0.011 0.004 -0.003 
  (1.404) (1.401) (1.372) (0.418) (0.390) (0.201) (-0.118) 
∆ln(GFCFshare) -0.034* -0.027 -0.047*** -0.016 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 
  (-1.784) (-1.570) (-2.853) (-0.772) (-0.486) (-0.635) (-0.528) 
∆ln(School) -0.087* -0.041 -0.051 -0.055 -0.016 -0.035 -0.063 
  (-1.686) (-0.905) (-1.222) (-1.099) (-0.410) (-0.669) (-1.366) 
∆vol(CSCPI) 0.002        
  (0.448)        
∆ln(Pop active)  -0.131       





  0.015      
    (0.764)      
∆ln(Financial dev)    -0.006     
     (-0.326)     
∆Capital open     0.013    
      (0.453)    
∆Democracy level      0.009   
       (0.362)   
∆ln(PPP GDP pc)       -0.043 
        (-0.637) 
N 1662 1659 1662 1360 1496 1604 1577 
N of countries 67 67 67 60 65 66 65 
Wald Chi² 13.247 25.157 25.716 12.513 11.793 23.291 16.190 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Specifications using the extensive margin index 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Ext margin) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.150* 0.216*** 0.136** 0.180 0.075 0.158** 0.148 
  (1.657) (2.807) (2.262) (1.534) (0.796) (2.386) (1.626) 
∆ln(REER) 0.095 0.024 0.077 -0.018 -0.082 0.018 -0.010 
  (1.350) (0.211) (0.916) (-0.187) (-0.970) (0.214) (-0.125) 
∆ln(GFCFshare) 0.053 0.022 0.061 0.019 0.010 0.037 0.080 
  (0.761) (0.405) (0.843) (0.332) (0.175) (0.619) (1.332) 
∆ln(School) -0.206 0.054 -0.173 0.041 -0.108 0.013 -0.249* 
  (-1.370) (0.403) (-0.990) (0.392) (-0.675) (0.089) (-1.689) 
∆vol(CSCPI) -0.052***        
  (-2.878)        
∆ln(Pop active)  -1.954       





  -0.044      
    (-0.698)      
∆ln(Financial dev)    0.036     
     (0.721)     
∆Capital open     -0.009    
      (-0.129)    
∆Democracy level      0.021   
       (0.369)   
∆ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.176 
        (0.802) 
N 1622 1619 1622 1345 1468 1565 1544 
N of countries 67 67 67 60 65 66 65 
Wald Chi² 15.308 8.770 8.136 3.172 2.077 6.267 7.928 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Specifications using the relative quality index 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Quality index) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.031 -0.030 -0.008 0.008 -0.013 -0.023 -0.021 
  (1.029) (-1.064) (-0.273) (0.224) (-0.467) (-0.758) (-0.800) 
∆ln(REER) -0.016 -0.008 0.002 -0.062* -0.035 -0.024 -0.015 
  (-0.611) (-0.307) (0.049) (-1.804) (-1.058) (-1.114) (-0.503) 
∆ln(GFCFshare) 0.023 0.037** 0.008 0.037** 0.024 0.021 0.021 
  (1.159) (2.454) (0.496) (2.067) (1.517) (1.100) (1.261) 
∆ln(School) -0.015 -0.010 0.027 0.008 -0.001 -0.021 0.004 
  (-0.318) (-0.208) (0.697) (0.251) (-0.024) (-0.463) (0.111) 
∆vol(CSCPI) -0.004        
  (-1.435)        
∆ln(Pop active)  -0.128       





  0.024      
    (1.141)      
∆ln(Financial dev)    -0.000     
     (-0.009)     
∆Capital open     0.005    
      (0.232)    
∆Democracy level      -0.016   
       (-0.594)   
∆ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.018 
        (0.343) 
N 1565 1562 1565 1270 1421 1508 1501 
N of countries 65 65 65 58 63 64 63 
Wald Chi² 4.934 7.356 2.111 7.641 3.695 3.594 2.614 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Specifications using the manufacturing VA share 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Manu share) 
∆ln(CSCPI) -0.005 -0.012 0.015 -0.021 -0.059 -0.076* 0.017 
  (-0.097) (-0.292) (0.393) (-0.375) (-0.967) (-1.721) (0.413) 
∆ln(REER) -0.183*** -0.195*** -0.141*** -0.095 -0.091 -0.109** -0.191*** 
  (-3.613) (-4.162) (-3.075) (-1.412) (-1.408) (-2.131) (-3.332) 
∆ln(GFCFshare) 0.073** 0.060** 0.024 0.048* 0.092*** 0.056* 0.057** 
  (2.377) (2.220) (0.762) (1.708) (3.008) (1.707) (1.994) 
∆ln(School) 0.001 0.012 0.066 -0.063 -0.005 0.017 0.007 
  (0.013) (0.172) (1.004) (-0.729) (-0.060) (0.228) (0.083) 
∆vol(CSCPI) -0.004        
  (-0.625)        
∆ln(Pop active)  -0.633       





  0.021      
    (0.537)      
∆ln(Financial dev)    -0.018     
     (-0.548)     
∆Capital open     0.006    
      (0.152)    
∆Democracy level      0.014   
       (0.586)   
∆ln(PPP GDP pc)       -0.230*** 
        (-2.619) 
N 1816 1813 1816 1460 1591 1707 1694 
N of countries 72 72 72 65 69 69 69 
Wald Chi² 19.106 23.461 11.485 5.887 11.992 10.809 22.113 




The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Appendix 7: CCEMG estimations with the lagged log form of the dependent variable 
 
Specifications using the concentration index 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Conc index) 
ln(Conc index)t-1 -0.520*** -0.651*** -0.575*** -0.645*** -0.593*** -0.598*** -0.591*** 
  (-9.836) (-13.320) (-12.106) (-12.463) (-11.996) (-12.772) (-12.417) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.064*** 0.049*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.064*** 
  (3.163) (2.804) (4.436) (2.877) (3.059) (3.346) (4.138) 
∆ln(REER) 0.025* 0.032** 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.014 0.023 
  (1.858) (2.469) (1.183) (1.125) (1.604) (1.139) (1.637) 
∆ln(GFCFshare) -0.012 -0.013 -0.002 -0.020* -0.026** -0.009 -0.017* 
  (-1.187) (-1.511) (-0.185) (-1.764) (-2.566) (-0.812) (-1.730) 
∆ln(School) -0.060** -0.067** -0.062** -0.104*** -0.091*** -0.078*** -0.059** 
  (-2.415) (-2.183) (-2.355) (-3.203) (-2.966) (-2.798) (-2.172) 
∆vol(CSCPI) 0.001        
  (0.427)        
∆ln(Pop active)  -0.062       





  -0.007      
    (-0.408)      
∆ln(Financial dev)    0.020**     
     (2.509)     
∆Capital open     0.025    
      (1.003)    
∆Democracy level      -0.002   
       (-0.138)   
∆ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.031 
        (1.357) 
N 2386 2383 2386 2002 2190 2310 2272 
N of countries 72 72 72 69 72 71 72 
Wald Chi² 117.619 199.932 173.384 184.520 172.232 184.113 183.532 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
Études et documents n° 15, CERDI, 2016
58
 Specifications using the intensive margin index 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Int margin) 
ln(Int margin)t-1 -0.517*** -0.678*** -0.566*** -0.625*** -0.590*** -0.627*** -0.604*** 
  (-11.635) (-15.709) (-12.554) (-12.415) (-13.533) (-15.372) (-12.897) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.049** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 
  (2.470) (3.112) (2.904) (3.142) (4.141) (3.584) (3.352) 
∆ln(REER) 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.008 0.010 0.023 
  (1.252) (1.392) (1.403) (1.116) (0.586) (0.749) (1.416) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.026** -0.016 -0.016 -0.004 -0.015 -0.005 -0.021* 
  (-2.524) (-1.348) (-1.173) (-0.279) (-1.165) (-0.426) (-1.652) 
ln(School) -0.037 -0.018 0.015 -0.029 -0.042 -0.043 -0.017 
  (-1.492) (-0.476) (0.464) (-0.911) (-1.216) (-1.224) (-0.543) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.002        
  (-0.819)        
ln(Pop active)  -0.011       





  -0.004      
    (-0.171)      
ln(Financial dev)    0.017**     
     (1.964)     
Capital open     0.049*    
      (1.713)    
Democracy level      0.003   
       (0.157)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.066** 
        (2.078) 
N 2386 2383 2386 2002 2190 2310 2272 
N of countries 72 72 72 69 72 71 72 
Wald Chi² 152.315 260.458 169.623 170.012 206.398 251.410 186.920 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
Études et documents n° 15, CERDI, 2016
59
 Specifications using the extensive margin index 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Ext margin) 
ln(Ext margin)t-1 -0.615*** -0.748*** -0.686*** -0.706*** -0.708*** -0.714*** -0.706*** 
  (-13.088) (-15.116) (-14.639) (-13.029) (-13.856) (-15.272) (-13.551) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.039 0.020 0.078 0.103 0.045 0.033 -0.017 
  (0.652) (0.350) (1.429) (1.509) (0.911) (0.755) (-0.296) 
∆ln(REER) 0.016 -0.006 0.037 -0.083 -0.011 0.007 -0.051 
  (0.402) (-0.124) (0.676) (-1.386) (-0.173) (0.146) (-0.829) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.020 0.011 -0.013 -0.059 -0.033 -0.011 0.010 
  (-0.521) (0.383) (-0.354) (-1.139) (-0.900) (-0.254) (0.256) 
ln(School) -0.075 -0.132 -0.113 -0.096 -0.128 -0.159 -0.090 
  (-0.769) (-1.255) (-1.133) (-0.912) (-1.570) (-1.462) (-1.144) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.020        
  (-1.412)        
ln(Pop active)  -0.386*       





  -0.067      
    (-1.268)      
ln(Financial dev)    -0.007     
     (-0.212)     
Capital open     0.032    
      (0.609)    
Democracy level      0.013   
       (0.191)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.057 
        (0.584) 
N 2317 2314 2317 1958 2135 2244 2210 
N of countries 72 72 72 68 72 71 72 
Wald Chi² 174.744 234.173 219.812 176.119 196.489 236.069 186.118 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Specifications using the relative quality index 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Quality index) 
ln(Quality index)t-1 -0.564*** -0.650*** -0.599*** -0.691*** -0.602*** -0.655*** -0.680*** 
  (-12.746) (-13.881) (-13.204) (-12.563) (-12.520) (-12.812) (-12.485) 
∆ln(CSCPI) -0.022 -0.022 0.000 -0.014 -0.007 0.003 -0.002 
  (-1.234) (-1.373) (0.008) (-0.689) (-0.408) (0.164) (-0.069) 
∆ln(REER) -0.014 0.006 -0.001 -0.008 -0.007 0.005 0.011 
  (-1.024) (0.369) (-0.071) (-0.475) (-0.468) (0.379) (0.807) 
ln(GFCFshare) 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.012 -0.007 0.004 -0.013 
  (0.133) (0.458) (0.239) (0.857) (-0.684) (0.395) (-1.261) 
ln(School) -0.001 -0.010 -0.012 -0.016 0.008 0.001 0.003 
  (-0.049) (-0.308) (-0.359) (-0.413) (0.306) (0.045) (0.109) 
vol(CSCPI) 0.004        
  (1.405)        
ln(Pop active)  0.018       





  0.005      
    (0.359)      
ln(Financial dev)    0.014     
     (1.265)     
Capital open     0.003    
      (0.112)    
Democracy level      0.017   
       (1.225)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       0.010 
        (0.300) 
N 2279 2276 2279 1902 2106 2204 2192 
N of countries 72 72 72 69 72 71 72 
Wald Chi² 167.029 195.071 174.658 161.038 157.716 165.988 158.219 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Specifications using the manufacturing VA share 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(Manu share) 
ln(Manu share)t-1 -0.445*** -0.522*** -0.489*** -0.560*** -0.464*** -0.519*** -0.529*** 
  (-13.062) (-15.357) (-14.592) (-13.379) (-12.178) (-15.570) (-13.671) 
∆ln(CSCPI) -0.051 -0.035 -0.031 -0.044 -0.016 -0.060* -0.037 
  (-1.569) (-1.252) (-0.847) (-1.085) (-0.357) (-1.767) (-1.008) 
∆ln(REER) -0.054** -0.065** -0.060** -0.082** -0.135*** -0.066** -0.061** 
  (-2.159) (-2.231) (-2.038) (-1.973) (-3.237) (-2.312) (-2.026) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.018 -0.010 -0.010 -0.018 -0.009 -0.007 0.008 
  (-0.827) (-0.488) (-0.358) (-0.694) (-0.321) (-0.333) (0.264) 
ln(School) 0.020 0.019 -0.023 0.019 0.046 0.022 0.009 
  (0.508) (0.291) (-0.517) (0.294) (0.791) (0.431) (0.209) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.004        
  (-0.724)        
ln(Pop active)  -0.018       





  0.044      
    (1.333)      
ln(Financial dev)    0.015     
     (0.705)     
Capital open     -0.003    
      (-0.099)    
Democracy level      0.017   
       (0.630)   
ln(PPP GDP pc)       -0.010 
        (-0.146) 
N 2601 2598 2601 2146 2327 2476 2461 
N of countries 76 76 76 73 75 74 76 
Wald Chi² 179.220 242.712 219.966 185.128 159.644 251.603 192.158 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
  
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Appendix 8: CCEMG estimations without small countries 
We exclude from the sample countries with an average population over the sample below 1 million inhabitants so 
that we exclude Iceland, Guyana, Suriname, Bahrain, Bhutan, Equatorial Guinea, and Solomon Islands. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆ln(Conc index) ∆ln(Int margin) ∆ln(Ext margin) ∆ln(Quality index) ∆ln(Manu share) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.142*** 0.120*** 0.130* -0.027 -0.054* 
  (5.429) (3.796) (1.699) (-1.302) (-1.772) 
∆ln(REER) 0.045*** 0.057*** -0.040 -0.016 -0.043 
  (3.083) (3.315) (-0.841) (-1.155) (-1.292) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.015* -0.016** 0.005 0.013 -0.006 
  (-1.852) (-2.250) (0.119) (1.622) (-0.346) 
ln(School) -0.024** 0.012 -0.171*** -0.013 0.034 
  (-2.034) (0.791) (-2.722) (-1.003) (1.093) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.004 -0.006 -0.024 0.004 -0.003 
  (-1.357) (-1.463) (-1.618) (1.372) (-0.378) 
N 2125 2125 2097 2035 2302 
N of countries 65 65 65 65 68 
Wald Chi² 48.386 33.226 13.638 8.548 6.266 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
 
Appendix 9: CCEMG estimations without countries from the OPEC 
We exclude countries who have been for at least 10 years during our time period members of the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which includes every current member (Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela) apart from Angola which has 
joined the organization in 2007, as well as Gabon which was a former member from 1975 to 1994. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆ln(Conc index) ∆ln(Int margin) ∆ln(Ext margin) ∆ln(Quality index) ∆ln(Manu share) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.130*** 0.106*** 0.194* -0.022 0.012 
  (4.848) (3.581) (1.776) (-0.919) (0.374) 
∆ln(REER) 0.033** 0.051** -0.122* -0.010 -0.083** 
  (2.055) (1.970) (-1.701) (-0.615) (-2.051) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.013 -0.008 0.001 0.001 0.003 
  (-1.569) (-0.718) (0.011) (0.079) (0.168) 
ln(School) -0.023 0.035* -0.245** -0.005 -0.017 
  (-1.261) (1.726) (-2.416) (-0.428) (-0.582) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.005* -0.007 -0.014 0.005 -0.001 
  (-1.803) (-1.499) (-0.778) (0.997) (-0.142) 
N 1925 1925 1856 1893 2130 
N of countries 59 59 59 60 63 
Wald Chi² 35.027 22.444 12.488 2.407 4.734 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
The constant is not reported in the table above 
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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 Appendix 10: CCEMG estimations with alternative REER variables 
As explained in appendix 5, we have computed two others REER series so we will check the sensitivity of our results 
to the change of our REER variable. The first table uses the REER based on the GDP deflator from the WEO instead of 
the PWT 8.0., while the second table uses REER computed with CPI from the WEO. 
Specifications using the REER computed thanks to the GDP deflator from the WEO 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆ln(Conc index) ∆ln(Int margin) ∆ln(Ext margin) ∆ln(Quality index) ∆ln(Manu share) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.258*** -0.017 -0.043 
  (4.670) (4.300) (3.221) (-0.882) (-1.039) 
∆ln(REER) 0.015 0.041** -0.096 -0.020 -0.063* 
  (1.153) (1.975) (-1.047) (-1.254) (-1.797) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.011 -0.007 -0.004 0.023*** -0.038 
  (-1.576) (-0.943) (-0.106) (2.820) (-1.628) 
ln(School) -0.017 0.018 -0.203*** -0.005 -0.002 
  (-1.350) (1.096) (-2.899) (-0.435) (-0.060) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.002 -0.006** -0.000 0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.308) (-2.145) (-0.019) (0.656) (-0.282) 
N 2223 2223 2161 2144 2411 
N of countries 70 70 70 70 75 
Wald Chi² 29.152 29.086 19.882 10.922 7.039 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
 
Specifications using the REER computed thanks to the CPI from the WEO 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆ln(Conc index) ∆ln(Int margin) ∆ln(Ext margin) ∆ln(Quality index) ∆ln(Manu share) 
∆ln(CSCPI) 0.125*** 0.114*** 0.204** -0.013 -0.049 
  (5.629) (4.581) (2.457) (-0.706) (-1.192) 
∆ln(REER) 0.004 0.011 -0.108 -0.025 0.001 
  (0.246) (0.519) (-1.116) (-1.552) (0.029) 
ln(GFCFshare) -0.010 -0.006 -0.019 0.019* -0.010 
  (-1.252) (-0.662) (-0.493) (1.883) (-0.426) 
ln(School) -0.010 0.011 -0.221*** -0.022* -0.019 
  (-0.895) (0.843) (-2.636) (-1.785) (-0.653) 
vol(CSCPI) -0.003* -0.006** -0.002 0.007* -0.002 
  (-1.944) (-2.300) (-0.115) (1.756) (-0.256) 
N 2203 2203 2141 2124 2394 
N of countries 70 70 70 70 75 
Wald Chi² 37.891 27.694 14.488 12.721 2.094 
* P-Value<0.10, ** P-Value <0.05, *** P-Value <0.01 
 
The constant is not reported in the table above 
The constant is not reported in the table above 
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